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SOVEREIGNTY IN ANTARCTICA
J. PETER A. BERNHARDT*
Antarctica, as its etymology implies, until recently was popularly conceived as a region of icefields opposite the North Pole,
a final frontier of continental unknowns inhabited by penguins and
friendly seals. Formerly the almost exclusive province of exploration giants such as Amundsen, Perry, Shackleton and Scott, that
continent has increasingly become the object of large national and
international expeditions since the Second World War. Time and
technology have started to erode the peaceful state of earlier
years. Since the entry into force of the 1959 Antarctic Treaty,'
these factors have generated a renewed interest in the legal rights
and relationships in the continent, especially insofar as they have
been affected or altered by the treaty regime.
The treaty, although a laudable and extremely practicable
approach to international political problems associated with Antarctica, does little more, legally speaking, than preserve an opaque
status quo ante, putting on ice the complex and contradictory
rights and claims lodged earlier by the contracting parties. Most
of these rights and claims were voiced in an earlier age and based,
with one notable exception, on traditional international legal
modes of acquiring title to territory. While it is true that the
moratorium created under the treaty causes unique problems in
relation to sovereign claims, the foundation of the issue is independent of the treaty, and although the issues are temporarily
eclipsed by the latter, they will ultimately, in no small measure,
be resolved by recourse to the traditional underpinnings. A reassessment of the problem is due given recent developments in:
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(1) the law of the sea; (2) the technological ability to explore
and to exploit minerals in a highly interdependent world rudely
introduced to the energy crisis; (3) the increase in activity of a
permanent nature in Antarctica; and (4) the imminent equinox
of the Antarctic Treaty's envisaged duration.
This article is divided into several sections. After a brief historic and geologic description of Antarctica, certain provisions of
the Antarctic Treaty relating to the issue of sovereignty are identified- and discussed. Then a section will follow which treats the
problems evinced in the treaty language by the fact that much of
Antarctica is composed of ice. The remainder of the article deals
with the problem of acquisition of territory in Antarctica under
traditional and nontraditional modes. Although not specifically
intended to posit United States' practice vis-d.-vis Antarctica, reference will be made to that practice as a convenient analytical
mode of examining the entire question.
I.

HISTORIC AND GEOLOGIC DESCRIPTION OF THE
ANTARCTIC CONTINENT

Antarctica, traditionally terra australis nondum cognita,2 is
the fifth largest continent of the world, comprising five and one
half million statute square miles.3 The continent is generally considered as consisting of two major areas, Eastern (Greater) and
Western (Lesser) Antarctica, divided by the Transantarctic
Mountains.4 Whereas Eastern Antarctica consists largely of a
high ice-covered plateau, Western Antarctica consists of an archipelago of mountainous islands covered and bonded together by
ice. 5 Primarily overlain by a continental ice sheet averaging
6,500 feet thick, many deep embayments of the Ross and Weddell Seas are covered by ice shelves, or ice sheets floating on the
sea.' The Ross, Ronne and Filchner Shelves around the continental periphery, along with lesser shelves, constitute approximately ten percent of the area of Antarctic ice. These shelves
and ice sheets "calve", or discharge icebergs into the sea along
7
the continental perimeter.
2. This term refers to the unknown land in the south.

3.
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Relatively little knowledge has been gleaned on -the geologic
substructure of Antarctica. However, recent discoveries have indicated that Eastern Antarctica is made up of a stable Precambrian shield, while Western Antarctica consists of a mobile belt
separated from East Antarctica by a fault block belt or horst, the
Transantarctic Mountains. Although it has been proposed that
Western Antarctica might be an oceanic island, its crustal thickness of about twenty miles indicates an absence of oceanic structure.8
As will become apparent from a theoretical legal viewpoint,
the relationship of the ice to the geomorphologic basement is important in weighing the merits and demerits of applying a continental versus high seas regime to Antarctica. Apart from the
question of whether the ice is fresh water or sea water in origin,
the fact that the immense weight and thickness of the ice cap,
shelves, and sheets have severely depressed what otherwise would
have -been a continental land mass with perhaps arcuate chains
gives rise to intriguing legal issues.
In considering the rock elevation beneath the thick,
grounded ice of Marie Byrd Land, it should be remembered that
the weight of the overlying ice has depressed the land surface approximately 500 meters, and up to 1,000 meters in the deepest
part of the central basin. Thus, sea level before the growth of
the ice in Western Antarctica could be represented fairly well by
the 500 meter contour.' Although the legal consequences, if any,
of a "lost continent" depressed under the Antarctic Ocean by the
polar ice cap must await the further development and refinement
of geophysical techniques, the very existence of the basement itself and its sialic nature indicates a closer relationship to terrestial
rather than to submarine areas.
8. Id.
9. Observers have written:
[Ilt may be seen that, with the exception of Roosevelt Island near Little
America Station, and the high spot centered around latitude 82 degrees
south, longitude 105 degrees west, the region between the Sentinel, Horlick and Queen Maud Mountains to the south and Kola Executive Committee and Edsel Ford Ranges to the north, is below sea level, most of
it at least 500 meters below.
This discovery together with that of a large channel in Marie Byrd Land
has disclosed that West Antarctica consists, in fact, of a great southward
extension of the Palmer Peninsula together with a mountainous island
or, more probably, series of islands, comprising the coastal ranges of
Marie Byrd Land.
Bentley, Crary, Ostenso, & Thiel, Structure of Western Antarctica, 131 ScipNcE
131, 133 (1960).
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Webster's New World Dictionary defines "land" as being
"the solid part of the earth's surface: distinguished from sea.""
The immediate question which arises is whether a land or high
seas regime should be applied to Antarctica. This in turn depends on several factors: the historic nature antecedent to the
current traditional high seas doctrine; the nature of the ice formations under discussion; and article VI of the 1959 Antarctic
1
Treaty.'
II.

HISTORIC ANTECEDENTS TO THE FREEDOM OF THE
HIGH SEAS DOCTRINE

The traditional high seas freedoms beyond the territorial seas
of nation-states have enjoyed a checkered history, primarily dictated in less enlightened eras by England's ability or inability to
dominate the high seas. Grotius contended that the sea could
not be state property because it could not really be taken into
possession through occupation, from which it followed that the sea
was free from the pretensions of sovereignty by any state. 1 2 This
power concept of the effectiveness of occupation and control
found further form in the establishment of the three mile territorial sea,' 3 a distance predicated at that time on -the ,theoretic
range of coastal cannon, and the state's consequent ability to de4
fend the territorial sea from invaders.'
Before Drake and the weather destroyed Philip II's Armada
in 1588, during an era in which the Armada was the paramount
naval force afloat, Queen Elizabeth I was the first European sovereign to enunciate the freedom of the seas doctrine. As Balch
states:
10. WrBSTEt'S NEw WORLD DIcrIoNARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (College ed., 1960).

11. The Antarctic Treaty, supra note 1.
12. 1 L. OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW 585 (8th ed. 1955)
cited as OPPENHEIM].

[hereinafter

13. This trend was primarily influenced by C. BYNKERSHOEK, DE DOMINIO
MARis (1702).
14. See Camden, Annales 225, in C. COLOMBOS, INT'L LAW OF THE SEA 83-4
(5th ed. 1962):
[S]he [Queen Elizabeth I to Mendoza, Ambassador of Phillip H to England] refused to admit that Spain had any right to debar British subjects
from trade or from freely sailing that vast ocean, seeing that the use of
the sea and air is common to all; neither can any title to the ocean belong to any people and private man for as much as neither nature or
regard of public use permitteth any possession thereof.

https://scholarlycommons.law.cwsl.edu/cwilj/vol5/iss2/4

4

Bernhardt: Sovereignty in Antarctica
1975

SOVEREIGNTY IN ANTARCTICA

What is the law applicable to the sea? Originally formulated
by Queen Elizabeth and more fully expounded by the Hollander, Hugo Grotius, the freedom of the high seas was controverted in the reign of Charles the First by the publication
of the treatise Mare Clausum written some years before by
England's ablest jurist at that time, John Selden. 15
As mentioned above, Grotius gave scholarly vent to the freedom of the seas doctrine in his treatise Mare Liberum, first published in 1609 in justification of the allied Low Countries' rights
against Portuguese sea power. 16 John Selden, however, attacked
Mare Liberum in his treatise Mare Clausum,17 and established a
principle incorporating English domination. The latter principle
remained part and parcel of the English high seas doctrine, whereby English men-of-war on the high seas required foreign ships to
dip their colors to the English standard in deference to the latter's
claim to the high seas. The doctrine remained in vogue until the
mid-Napoleonic period, when pre-eminent English sea power, the
burgeoning of global trade, and a nascent empire dictated an endorsement of the freedom of the high seas principle as inuring
to the English advantage.' 8
The original reason postulated by Grotius for freedom of
the seas was that the high seas were incapable of effective occupation. Another prevalent rationale involved the notion that the
riches of the sea were inexhaustible and that there was therefore
no need for any state to claim them to the exclusion of others.
Neither of these notions are currently maintained. However, the
third reason then espoused, the need for unimpeded passage and
communication, is still prevalent:
[T]he real reason for the freedom of the open sea is represented in the motive which led to the attack against marine
sovereignty, and is the purpose for which such attack was
made-mainly, the freedom of communications and especcially commerce, between the states which are separated by
the sea. The sea being an international highway which connects distant lands, it is the common conclusion that it should
15. Balch, The Arctic and Antarctic Region and the Law of Nations, 4 AM.
J. INT'L L. 265 (1910).
16. See generally H. Gao-ius, MAE LIBERUM (1609) [hereinafter cited as
GROTUS]. See also J. BRiFLY, LAW OF NATIONS 305 (6th ed. 1963) [hereinafter
cited as BRIE..Y].
17. J. SELDEN, OF THE DOMINION, OR, OwNEvasfp OF THE SEA (MAmm
CLAUSUM) (Nedham 1972).
18. C. COLOMBOS, INTERNATIONAL LAW OF THE SEA 53 (5th ed. 1962).
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not be under the sway of any state whatsoever. It is in -the interest of free intercourse between the state that the principle
of the freedom of the open sea has become universally recognized and will always be upheld. 19
Thus the prevailing reasoning behind the high seas principle appears to -have little applicability to Antarctica. A further examination of this issue, therefore, must be undertaken. It will be preceded by a discussion of the nature and characteristics of Antarctic ice.
III.

THE ANTARCTIC ICE

Antarctic ice occurs in three major forms: pack ice, ice
shelves, and ice sheets. Pack ice is generally categorized as sea
ice, and is formed by the freezing of sea water. Although normally brittle and broken up by the sea state, pack ice near land
may attach itself to shore and become what is called an ice foot.
Shelf ice, initially generically the same as pack ice, forms on the
surface of the sea, but normally in bays or other sheltered areas.
Such deposits may build up a shelf which remains attached to the
land for many years. Such shelf ice can reach thicknesses of 5001000 feet, as in the Ross Sea, and on its most seaward extremities
is subject to calving; that is, the breaking away of large pieces
into the sea. Ice sheets, on the other hand, are generally considered land ice, and are formed on land by the freezing of fresh
water or the compacting of snow as layer upon layer adds to the
pressure on that beneath. On the Antarctic Plateau ice caps form
and remain throughout the year, some attaining seVeral thousand
feet in thickness.2"
When the ice is terrestial in nature, as is sheet ice, not as
many legal problems are evinced. But where the ice is-sea-based,
such 'as is the case with pack ice or shelf ice, fifty years of exegesis have not resolved the regimes issue.
An interesting vantage on the ice issue is tangentially provided by Oppenheim, in his definition of high seas:
The open sea, or the high seas, is the coherent body of salt
water all over the greater part of the globe, with the exception of the maritime belt and the territorial straits, gulfs, and
bays, which are part of the sea but not parts of the open
sea. Wherever there is a salt-water sea on the globe, it is a part
19. OPPENHEDx, supra note 12, at 593-94.
20. N. BoWDITcH, AMERICAN PRACTICAL NAVIGATION 747-48 (1962).
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of the open sea, provided it is not isolated from, but coherent
with, the general body of salt water extending over the globe,
to it is navigable
and provided that the salt water 2 approach
1
and open to vessels of all nations.
Leaving aside the navigability and open approach issues which
would clearly remove most Antarctic ice from any high seas regime, Oppenheim maintains that the high seas must be a "coherent body of salt water."2 2 Would this, then, imply that fresh water
could not be the subject of a high seas regime, and possibly provide a partial key in resolving this issue?
The nature of the ice precludes such a possibility. Depending upon the temperature, the trapped brine in sea ice either
freezes or remains liquid, but due to its density, settles downward. As settling occurs, the ice gradually freshens so that after
two years of initial formation, virtually all salt has been eliminated.
Icebergs originally formed from sea ice contain no salt with the
passage of time, and uncontaminated melt water obtained from
them is fresh. Thus it would be highly impractical, if not impossible, to ascertain the "dividing line" between the high seas and
mainland Antarctica based on the above criterion. In similar vein,
even if Oppenheim's definition were accorded oecumenical subscription it would be impracticable to insist that ice shelves over
the open sea are not a "coherent -body of salt water"2 merely because ice, especially that composing the Antarctic barriers, is not
coherent with the body of water comprising the high seas.
The Arctic experience of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries has provided much guidance on possible approaches to the ice problem. However, given the fact that Arctic
ice is completely devoid of terrestrial origins, and that the North
Polar ice cap is completely floating on the high seas, much of the
guidance provided is initially misleading if not carefully evaluated.
Lakhtine, in discussing Arctic ice, states with regard to the above
distinction:
We are of the opinion that floating ice should be assimilated
legally to open polar seas, whilst ice formations that are more
or less immovable should enjoy a legal status equivalent to
24
polar territory.
OPPENHEIM, supra note 12, at 587 (footnotes omitted).
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. Lakhtine, Rights Over the Arctic, 24 AM. J. INT'L L 703, 712 (1930)
[hereinafter cited as Lakhtine].
21.
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Although much of Lakhtine's writing was written in the
1920's in a quite apparent and febrile attempt to substantiate the
then recently proclaimed Soviet sector principle and, therefore,
should largely be discounted, there is merit to his distinction
drawn here. Balch neatly draws this distinction when he states
that the frozen oceans of the North Pole, as they are in continual
motion moving from the Bering Straits towards the Atlantic Ocean,
are incapable of being owned; but that immobile ice such as exists at the outh Pole may be made the subject of sovereignty.2"
Rolland maintains that a permanent surface of ice extending from
the coast out towards the sea should be a continuation of
the land.2"
There are an equal number of proponents of the view that
ice is not land and therefore is incapable of being subsumed in
any terrestrial regime. Clute maintains that even if large areas
of the Arctic Sea are frozen up, it must still be regarded as an
open sea and thus not subject to claims of sovereignty. 27 Oppenheim asserts that the North Pole cannot be occupied "as there is
no land on the North Pole. '28 Fouchille maintains, on the other
hand, that ice, being in its nature essentially different from water
as well as from dry land, can be made with some limitations the
object of exploitation.2 9
Smedal, in his excellent and definitive article Acquisition of
Sovereignty over Polar Areas, on which much of the sector principle discussion of this article is based, ably synthesizes these convergent views and provides a basis on which to proceed:
[I]f we now raise -the question whether the Ross Barrier can
be subjected to sovereignty then the question is least difficult
to answer with regard to that part of the Barrier which rests
on solid ground. It must be put on a par with a land territory,
and it can be occupied.
Doubts arise when the question affects that part of the
barrier which is afloat. We are of opinion that since there is
25. See Balch, supra note 15, at 266. See also Waultrin, Le probl~me de
la souverainetM des poles, XVI REv. GEN. DE DRorr INT. PUBLIQUE 649-60, passim

(1909).
26. L. Rolland, Alaska: Maison de jeu itablie sur les gldces au dild de la
limite des eaux territoriales, XI REv. GEN. DE DROIT INT. PUBLIQUE 340-42
(1904).
27. 1 G. HACKWORTH, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 452 (1940) [hereinafter cited as HAcKwoRm].
28. Id.
29. Lakhtine, supra note 24, at 712.
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no natural borderline between the two parts of the barrier,
and as the latter appears externally as a whole, the same
principle should apply to the whole extent of the barrier.
,In appearance it resembles a land territory rather more
than a sea territory. At the barrier edge all navigation obviously ceases. In this instance it is difficult to plead the considerations that have formed the rule that the sea cannot be
made subject to the sovereignty of a state. We are, therefore, of the opinion that good reasons favor the view that the
Ross Barrier should be regarded as land and can be the object of sovereignty ....
What has been said above on the question of sovereignty
in respect to Ross Barrier, applies also to other barriers resembling the Ross Barrier.30
Smedal's synthesis, accounting for the dichotomy between
floating and non-floating ice, proceeded one step further. In examining the Ross Barrier he addressed the subject of thick floating ice, which for all apparent purposes is immobile, even though
it is in fact slowly advancing towards the open ocean where it
calves. Although this phenomenon was not per se mentioned in
his article, he was doubtless cognizant of it, its discovery having
been attested to in another article two years before:
Captain Scott in his two studies of the Barrier Edge in
1902 and 1911 noted that the greater part of the ice-field
had advanced at the rate of about a mile a year, but he also
found that there were two fixed
points where neither advance
81
nor recession was appreciable.
It is further submitted that Smedal's analysis should not be
discounted merely due to the phenomenon of calving. While it
is true that under general terrestrial principles the loss of such
legal portions of a land domain is unusual, the process should be
analogized to accretion, erosion, and avulsion, as these processes
are not inherently dissimilar in nature. While calving generally
30. G. SMEDAL, AcQUIsrnION OF SOVEREIGNTY OVER POLAR REGIONS 30-31
(1931) [hereinafter cited as SMEDAL]. See also D. PHARAND, THE LAw OF THE
SEA OF THE Aac'rTc wrrH SPECIAL REFERENCE TO CANADA 86 (1973) [hereinafter
cited as PHARAND]:
[Als long as those huge ice tongues are joined to the land [referring
to Ellesmere] and the glaciers which produced them-in other words,
as long as they remain ice shelves-they are generally considered as land
since their thickness and immobility make them as effective a barrier
to navigation as land itself.
31. See C. HAYES, ANTARCTICA: A TREATISE ON THE SOUTHERN CONTINENT,
at 54 (1928).
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produces sudden, significant territorial changes, avulsion also refers to a "sudden change in the channel of a stream,.
."32 Even
fewer problems are present if wave action causes the gradual erosion of the seaward edge of an ice barrier, as this phenomenon
is very similar to erosion.
Earlier objections raised to the treatment of Arctic ice under
a terrestrial regime were to a large degree based on the inherent
difference between the nature of Arctic and Antarctic ice. Phar'and objects to the treatment of Arctic polar ice as immobile, not
because of the type of mobility associated with the Ross Barrier,
but because, unlike 'the latter, no part of the Arctic polar ice cap
proper is either attached to or resting upon land. The problem
he refers to is that Arctic ice is and was originally pack ice, and
thus in constant motion without reference to any fixed continental
point. "Such a view [that Arctic ice should be a valid object of
territorial sovereignty]," he says, "does not take sufficient account
of the fact that the North Pole [rests] on 4,300 meters of water
. ... "8
Balch alludes to the same problem:
But the ice at the North Pole is never at rest. It is in continual motion. It moves slowly in a direction from Bering's
Strait towards the Atlantic Ocean. Consequently any habitation fixed upon it would be continually moving. And such
possible occupation would be too precarious and shifting to
and fro to give anyone a good title. And so the rules of the
Law of Nation' that recognize the freedom of the high seas,
would seem to apply naturally to a moving and shifting substance like the North Polar Sea ice at all points beyond the
34
customary three-mile limit from the shore.
The above illustrations demonstrate that given an appreciation of
the fixed versus floating nature of the ice in the antipodes, prior
legal authorities would not necessarily share similar sentiments
were they writing today on the same issue in Antarctica.
When examining "continental" Antarctica as distinguished
from the ice shelves and the barriers, unique problems also arise.
As alluded to earlier, Eastern Antarctica presents little problem;
the continental mass is typified on a large scale by a simple structure of broad basins and swells, with the rock surface being at
32. 0. SVARLIEN, AN INTRODUCTION
33. PuRN, supra note 30, at 84.

TO THE LAW OF NATIONS

182 (1955).

34. Balch, supra note 15.
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an altitude of zero to two hundred meters.3 5 However as a result
of glacial depression, there are several depressions below present
sea level.38
The subglacial topography of Western Antarctica, however,
is more complicated. Much of central Western Antarctica is a
deep basin, with depressions as great as 2500 meters below sea
level. This channel is connected by other channels to the Bellingshausen, Amundsen, and Ross Seas, all of which, even after
isostatic rebound, would remain under present sea level. Such
isostatic rebound would isolate the high standing areas of coastal
Marie Byrd Land and Thurston Land as islands.3 7
What real-world significance does isostatic rebound and Antarctic subglacial geomorphology hold for us? Rebound in itself,
and a presence of islands and surrounding seas in Western Antarctica, should be accorded but slight attention. Even if man is able,
it is highly unlikely that he will embark on so ambitious a project
as one which would submerge most of the major coastal cities and
adjacent coastal plains of the world. Nor will such a phenomenon
occur during the projected future of mankind. In that it precludes any possibility of navigation, however, it is significant that
a depressed geologic basin is extant in most of Eastern Antarctica and part of Western Antarctica. For that matter, the very
thickness of the shelf ice precludes submarine navigation for the
greatest part of the continent. Seismic tests by the United States
Navy in the immediate vicinty of the South Pole indicate there
was an accumulation of 8,200 feet of dense ice, topped by twenty
feet of harder ice, topped, in turn, by surface layers of snow and
ice seventy-seven feet thick. 8
In this regard, Hayton states:
In any event the complications for international law are numerous when it must be conceded that thousands of square
miles of interior Antarctic surface are in reality ten thousand
feet of rigid ice over rock that is well below seal level. If this
ice were melted, much of the area would clearly be only "high
seas." Such a holding under present conditions is patently
absurd. It is not yet known whether the ice in these belowsea-level regions is frozen fresh or frozen sea water. Even if
35. See text accompanying notes 2 through 9, supra.
36. T. HATHERTON, ANTARCrICA 282 (1965) [hereinafter cited as HATuER-

TON].
37. Id. at 281.
38. TIME, Dec. 23, 1957, at 26a.
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a basic continent with its major portions above sea level is finally confirmed and delimited, there may be the anomaly of
fringe portions of the Antarctic totality consisting of "islands"
bound together for eons by a layer of solid ice rising from below sea-level bedrock to an altitude of several thousand feet
above sea level. If Marie Byrd Land should turn out to be
this kind of ice-bound archipelago, what should the U.S. position be with respect to the application of the law in
this case?39
If the isostatic rebound argument or the geologic inquiry is
carried beyond these reasonable initial observations in any exhaustive analysis, the difficulties raised far outweigh any realworld solution to be derived therefrom. For example, if the summit of Marie Byrd Land, which would be islands if the ice sheet
was removed, would be considered as islands in the present frozen "sea," then the ice sheet covering the "island" above sea level
could be subjugated to a land regime. But could this island
"coast" be determined with any accuracy?
If the Antarctic Treaty language itself is examined it is apparent that article VI of the treaty treats all ice shelves, as distinguished from pack ice, as glacies firma. It provides:
The provisions of the present Treaty shall apply to the area
south of 600 South Latitude, including all ice shelves, but
nothing in the present Treaty shall prejudice or in any way
affect the rights, or the exercise of rights, of any State under
international law with regard to the high seas within that
area. 40
The above article, while answering some questions, also
raises some. It certainly assimilates ice shelves to the "area" of
Antarctica and therefore presumably to a land status. The adverb
"presumably" is used not ex abundanti cautela,4 ' for nowhere in
the treaty is the word "land" or "continent" used as referring -to
Antarctica. Rather, it is always referred to as "Antarctica" or
39. Hayton, Polar Problems in International Law, 52 AM. J. INT'L L. 746,
761 (1958).
Cf. Hayton, The Antarctic Settlement of 1959, 54 Am. J. INT'L
L 349, states:
A more or less land-locked ice-cap in firm union with the bedrock beneath is, because of its origin, probably made up chiefly of frozen fresh
water, or compressed and transformed snow, not frozen salt water ....
Whether certain portions of Antarctic are shown to be only islands ....
Id. at 360 n.36.
40. The Antarctic Treaty, supra note 1, art. VI.
41. This phrase translates: "out of abundant caution." BLAc:'s LAw DicTIONARY 659 (4th ed. 1951).
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"area." Thus, as a matter of technical interpretation, it is unclear
whether any part of Antarctica at all is to be considered land.
There are, however, several valid rejoinders to this question. First,
mountain chains of both sea level and ice level cannot be considered as anything but terra firma from a logical viewpoint. Second, article VI of the treaty in a comparative fashion distinguishes
between "high seas" and "area,"42 ' and since (in the Antarctic
context at least) the only principal regimes would be the high seas
and the land, it can reasonably be assumed that "area" equates
with "land." Finally, the acts of the parties, during both the term
of the treaty and the period of discovery of the continent, have
indicated the parties always acted toward Antarctica as if it had
been land. This being so, ice shelves -to all intents and purposes
have been assimilated to the land regime. Since the treaty specifically provided for this particular category of ice to the exclusion
of any other, it can be assumed that pack ice has not been included within the land definition. The same may also be held
to apply to ice islands which occur in the area south of 60 degrees
south latitude.
The freedom of navigation principle, as the basis of the high
seas regime today, has already been discussed. Little need be
said to indicate that the Antarctic presents very limited opportunity for traditional surface or subsurface navigation.
By far the greater part of the interior is covered by an unknown thickness of snow and ice which extends generally as
far on the coast. Along the coast there is a special formation of ice called shelf ice or the barrier. It stretches from
land towards the sea and varies in height from some few feet
to over 100 feet above the level of the sea. Its surface is
approximately43horizontal, but it terminates on the sea side in
vertical cliffs.
42. The Antarctic Treaty, supra note 1, art. VI.
43. Cole, Claims of Sovereignty over the Antarctic, at 11 (unpublished thesis on file with the Judge Advocate General School of Charlottesville, Virginia).
He continues:
In appearance it resembles a land territory rather than a sea territory.
At the barrier edge all navigation obviously ceases. In this instance it
is difficult to plead the considerations that have formed as a rule that
the sea cannot be made subject to the sovereignty of a state. We are,
therefore, of the opinion that good reasons favor the view that the Ross
Barrier should be regarded as land and can be the object of sovereignty.
What has been said above of the question of sovereignty in respect of
Ross Barrier applies also to other barriers resembling the Ross Sea.
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Finally, in connection with navigation and Antarctic ice, the
argument could be voiced that because navigation might be possible to some degree under -the seaward coast of certain ice shelf
borders of Antarctica, it would be impossible for any states to
claim sovereignty over such an area from a security viewpoint.
Several responses could be made. First, under prevailing international law, the right of innocent passage is accorded all ships, including submarines, although the latter are required to navigate
on the surface and show their flag.44 Second, assuming that sovereignty over the submerged lands of the adjacent continental
shelf has already been granted coastal states, is there any valid
reason why the reverse of this state of affairs could not equally
apply as a valid one (that is, to treat the land above as sovereign
and the waters below res communis omnium)? First of all, from
a practical vantage, the problem would be de minimis, as only few
areas of Antarctica would admit of such submarine navigation;
second, in most places where -the ice shelves would so admit, their
thickness would be so great as to preclude any danger from submarine navigation to the territorial sovereign above; third, a territorial sovereign would in all probability be entitled to a territorial
sea in which he could, in his discretion, prohibit such subsurface
navigation, thereby preventing the problem from ever arising.
While recognizing the present right of innocent passage accorded
capital ships through the territorial sea, a submarine under thick
ice would in all probability render little threat.
In summary, there is no logical or compelling legal reason,
including navigational freedom, why the shelf and sheet ice of
Antarctica should not be assimilated to a land regime governing
that continent.

IV.

EFFECT OF TREATY TERMINATION

As alluded to previously, prior discovery and exploration and
current activities of the United States in Antarctica achieve their
greatest relevance and significance when applied to the sovereignty issue in light of the legal state of affairs which will apply
after the treaty terminates. Although the treaty does not provide
for any specific termination date per se, it has been the practice
of most contracting parties to regard the treaty regime as a tem44. 1958 Convention on the Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone, 15 U.S.T.
1606, T.I.A.S. 5639, 516 U.N.T.S. 205, art. XIV (6).
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porary one and to interpret article XII(2)(a) of the treaty as one
signifying the termination of the present regime 30 years after the
entry into force of the treaty. Article XII(2)(a) of the treaty provides:
If after the expiration of thirty years from the date of entry
into force of the present Treaty, any of the Contracting Parties whose representatives are entitled to participate in the
meetings provided for under Article IX so requests by a communication addressed to the depository Government, a Conference of all the Contracting Parties shall be held as soon as
45
practicable to review the operation of the Treaty.
In addition to this contemplated date, the complementary provisions of article XII(1)(a) and (2)(c) provide for possible withdrawal by any contracting party:
XII (1) (a). The present Treaty may be modified or amended at any time by unanimous agreement of the Contracting
Parties whose representatives are entitled to participate in the
meetings provided for under Article IX. Any such modification or amendment shall enter into force when the depository
Government has received notice from all such Contracting
Parties that they have ratified it.
XII (2) (c). If any such modification or amendment has not
entered into force in accordance with the provisions of subparagraphs l(a) of this Article within a period of two years
after the date of its communication to all the Contracting
Parties, any Contracting Party may at any time after the expiration of that period give notice to the depository Government of its withdrawal from the present Treaty; and such
withdrawal shall take effect two years after the receipt of the
46
notice by the depository Government.
It can be seen from an interpretation of the last two provisions that it would be an extremely straightforward matter for any
contracting party whose interests dictated disassociation from the
treaty regime to release itself therefrom. Either it could fail to
ratify a modification or amendment by another contracting party,
or on its own initiative, it could submit a modification or amendment which could not fail to elicit disapprobation by another contracting party. In either case the result would be the same: release from ,the treaty regime within two years of the submission
45. The Antarctic Treaty, supra note 1, art. XII 2.(a).
46. The Antarctic Treaty, supra note 1, arts. XH 1.(a); XII 2.(c).
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of the amendment. This, it should be remembered, is entirely
independent of the thirty year term intimated in article XII(2)
(a), and could theoretically occur within two years of the present.
If, however, there remains any doubt as to the interim nature
of the treaty and the effect of article XII(2)(a), any modicum
of reflection dictates that no state has permanently surrendered
its claims to Antarctica.17 Article IV of the treaty, the single -article perhaps most responsible for the signing of the treaty by the
original contracting parties in 1959, confirms the fact:
1. Nothing contained in the present Treaty shall be interpreted as:
(a) a renunciation by any Contracting Party of previously asserted rights of or claims to territorial sovereignty
in Antarctica;
(b) a renunciation or diminution by any Contracting
Party of any basis of claim to territorial sovereignty in Antarctica which it may have whether as a result of its activities
or those of its nationals in Antarctica, or otherwise;
(c) prejudicing the position of any Contracting Party
as regards its recognition or non-recognition of any other
State's right of or claim or basis of claim to territorial sovereignty in Antarctica.
2. No acts or activities taking place while the present Treaty
is in force shall constitute a basis for asserting, supporting or
denying a claim to territorial sovereignty in Antarctica or
create any rights of sovereignty in Antarctica. No new claim,
or enlargement of an existing claim, to territorial sovereignty
in Antarctica shall be asserted while the present Treaty is in
force.

48

The primary justification dictating the preparation of this article
is embodied within the terms of these last provisions. They are
the operative ones with respect to the entire sovereignty question
in Antarctica for the present and envisageable future, and with,
respect to the past as -that may be interpreted in the present and
future.
Having considered the general reservation of the status quo
ante, the first point to be noted is that article IV(b) provides that
nothing in the treaty shall be interpreted as a renunciation or a
47. Especially given the host of conflicting national claims to Antarctica
during the 19.59 Conference and the dormant claims still voiced in the more sensational irredentist-inspired legal publications by certain contracting parties.

48. The Antarctic Treaty, supra note 1, art. IV.
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diminution of a claim which a party may have.4" It is possible
that the use of the word "may" could be construed so as to signify
a possibility or likelihood in the future.5 0 It is clear that activities
initiated after the treaty is in force can be used as a basis for asserting sovereign claims on the continent. The executed nature
of continuing activities initiated during the treaty regime lends itself to a similar interpretation. Also, if it is recognized that only
such claims as are continuing after termination could be used successfully to assert sovereign claims on the basis of occupation
given the present situation in Antarctica, and that it is unlikely
that bases found under the present regime will be abandoned or
not continue to be the scene of continuing activities, the real-world
effect would be the same regardless of time of initiation of such
activities. However, due to the executed nature of such activities,
the following explanation indicates that such a treaty provision
cannot have any effect after termination.
Two articles in the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of
Treaties are pertinent to any discussion of Article IV of the Ant'arctic Treaty. Aricle 43 of the Vienna Convention states:
The invalidity, termination, or denunciation of a treaty,
the withdrawal of a party from it, or the suspension of its operation, as a result of the application of the present Convention or of the provisions of the treaty, shall not in any way
impair the duty of any state to fulfill any obligation embodied
in the treaty to which it would be subject under international
law independently of the treaty. 5 '
Article 70 of the Vienna Convention provides:
,Unless the treaty otherwise provides or the parties otherwise agree, the termination of a treaty under its provisons or
in accordance with the present Convention: (a) releases the
parties from any obligation further to perform the treaty; (b)
does not affect any right, obligation or legal situation of the
parties created
through the execution of the treaty prior to its
52
termination.
49. Id., art. IV(b) (emphasis added).
50. This interpretation is validated by referring to the parallel French text,
which reads "qui pourrait risulter de ses propres activitis ou celles de ses ressortissants dans l'Antarctique." The use of the conditional tense is more closely
linked with the future tense than with the present.
51. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, art. 43, 63
AM. J. INT'L L. 875 (1969) at 889.
52. Id., art. 70, at 897.
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Article 43 creates no problem for contracting parties whose obligations under the Treaty have terminated, as there is clearly no
obligation under international law either to refrain from acts of
discovery or occupation in terra nullius, or in areas in which the
state justifiably fails to recognize sovereign claims put forward by
other states. Article 70, however, presents more difficulty. Is
there any obligation or legal situation incumbent on a party created during the time the treaty is in force which perforce continues after termination? To answer this question there must first
be an examination of the nature of the activity in question, such
as future construction of bases on Antarctica.
Lord McNair indicates the appropriate distinction to be
drawn:
In so far as the provisions of a treaty have already been executed and have had their effect before the termination, they
have passed beyond the sphere of the operation of the termination; something has been done; for instance, territory has
been ceded, persons or movables have been surrendered, and
in many cases new rights and statuses have been created
which, although they owe their origin to the treaty, have acquired an existence independent of it; the termination cannot touch them.
On the other hand, other provisions take
the form of continuing obligations and operate de die in diem
so long as the treaty remains in existence, for instance, to surrender alleged criminals of certain types, to attribute a particular nationality to persons born in certain circumstances;
upon termination no further rights of this type can accrue.
If we may borrow the terminology of English law, this is the
difference between executed and executory obligations; .... 53
Some doubt might be raised as to whether erecting sites -are activities which "have already been executed and have had -their effect before the termination. ' , 4 However, doubt is removed upon
reading the second part of the compound beginning "on the other
hand," 15 as it seems clear that such activities are quite unrelated
to Lord McNair's given examples. Such an act is therefore beyond the sphere of application of the treaty. Such acts, while
"non-rights" during application of the -treaty, must become vested
ones 'after the treaty termination, for it would be impossible to
53. L. McNAm,
McNARI.

THE LAW OF TREATIES

531-32 (1961) [hereinafter cited as

54. id.
55. Id.
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ignore the existence of such bases and continuing activities associated with them.56 However, after lapse of the treaty regime
it would perhaps be politic pro forma to make a new formal declaration as to such bases and send new teams to them in order
to disassociate such continuing activities from those conducted under the treaty, thereby giving them an independent, de novo, existence.
Sir Gerald Moore supports Lord McNair's reasonings:
It is an accepted rule of treaty law that the termination of a
treaty, for whatever cause and in whatever way, can only affect its continuing obligations and cannot per se affect or
prejudice any right already definitively and finally acquired
under it, or undo or reverse anything affected by any clause
of an executed character in the treaty. Thus a payment
made under the treaty does not become repayable; a settlement of a dispute affected by a treaty does not become reopened because the treaty terminates or is denounced; demarcated frontiers are not rendered indeterminate; cessions
57
of territory are not cancelled, etc.
Lord McNair's explanatory footnote to the first sentence of Sir
Gerald's observation is most germane:
[W]hich would, as I understand it, denote not only rights acquired at the time of, and as a result of, the conclusion of the
treaty but also rights which a party has acquired later, for
itself or its nationals, during the currency of the treaty and before termination, in pursuance of a power conferred upon it
by that treaty; for instance to acquire concessions upon a defined area of the other party's territory.58
Both Lord McNair and Sir Gerald, in discussing the nature of the
obligation, had occasion to refer to the word "rights," a nebulous
term of art. Taken in a broad concrete sense, a right signifies
a power, privilege, faculty or demand, inherent in one person and
incident upon another, or as "powers of free action." In a narrower sense and one more appropriately suited to our examina56. If the existence of bases cannot be gainsaid, and if the right to such
bases can be said to inure to any state, the logical recipient of such a right would
perforce be the building and occupying state. And as the Treaty was ab initio
but a temporary arrangement, it would be irrational to presume that any state
would consent upon signing the Treaty to surrendering the investments of the
"Treaty years" upon termination of that instrument.
57. McNAnt, supra note 53, at 532-33.
58. Id., n.4 at 532.
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tion, the term denotes an interest or title in an object of property.

59

A distinction should be observed here. Lord McNair speaks
concurrently of both obligations and rights. In the example posited for discussion, that is, the construction and maintenance of
Antarctic bases, we are talking of two separate problems: first,
the obligations, if any, of the contracting party to refrain from using bases constructed during the treaty regime as a basis for posttreaty sovereign claims, and second, the status of the base itself.
The first obligation is a right in personam, one imposing obligations on a definite person natural or juridical; the second is a right
in rem, being one which imposes an obligation on persons generally. If one, for the purpose of discussion, treats the treaty parties
as being all the world, Lord McNair's analysis of article IV(2)
of the treaty would translate the latter as both a right in rem and
in personam: the former, as the right to property erected in terra
nullius can only amount to a right in rem (in -the claimant's view)
as against all the world (and given the temporary nature of the
treaty); the latter, as the obligation owing the other treaty parties
to refrain from using such bases as claims to sovereignty during
the treaty regime. Therefore, it is submitted that there is indeed
a right attaching to the establishment of bases and related activities thereto in Antarctica, that the right is in large part executed
although executory in nature, and that article IV of the treaty
would not preclude the contracting parties from continuing to utilize bases constructed during the period in which the treaty was
in force and to lodge claims to territorial sovereignty thereon.60
V.

TRADITIONAL MODES OF ACQUISITION OF TERRITORY
APPLICABLE TO ANTARCTICA

Having concluded that article IV of the treaty does not
poardize the previously -asserted rights or claims to territorial
ereignty in Antarctica, and that activities initiated during
treaty regime may, after its termination, provide the basis of

jeosovthe
soy-

59.

See BLAC'S LAw DIcTIONARY 1558 (3d ed. 1933).
60. It is more reasonable to maintain that such activities are executed
in nature. None could state that the erection of a permanent installation (apart
from the activities which are of a continuing nature, although there is no obligation on the administering State to continue them) is executory in nature. If the
law of treaties recognizes that there are but two forms of obligations, executed
and executory, and if, as stated, the activity in question is not executory, it can
be but executed.
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ereign territorial claims in Antarctica, the modes of acquisition of
territory in Antarctica must be examined.
A.

TerritorialAcquisition in General

"The sovereignty of territory may be acquired by occupation,
prescription, cession, conquest, and accretion."'" Of these five,
only two actually apply to Antarctica. Cession, a mode of transferring title to territory from one state to another, has not occurred
in Antarctica and need not be discussed. Given the Charter of
the United Nations and the duties incumbent on its members
thereunder, it is highly doubtful whether conquest is still a valid
means of acquiring title to territory. Certainly it has not been
a form of title evoked in Antarctica to date; it would not be allowed under the treaty, and it is highly improbable after its termination. As already discussed, accretion occurs in Antarctica only
62
in a related and reverse form (calving).
The primary mode of acquiring sovereignty in Antarctica is
occupatio, coupled with discovery. 68 Diverse problems associated
with the history of Antarctica and continuing into the present time
-problems to a large degree dictated by the severe climatic conditions of that continent-have created certain exceptions to the
traditional occupatio doctrine. Before applying it to Antarctica,
therefore, an examination of the nature of the doctrine and of its
historical antecedents is warranted.
James Cook was the first explorer of modern times to be associated with Antarctica when he circumnavigated that continent
during the years 1772-75.11 Although open to conjecture, Gottlieb von Bellingshausen, a Russian, is credited with first sighting
the continent in 1820." Thereafter, the coasts of Antarctica
were the subject of whaling and sealing expeditions by many nations. The first notable historic claim per se to Antarctica was
forwarded by Dumont D'Urville in 1837-1840, when he claimed
Ad6lie Land for France. 68
Most discoveries and formal claims were espoused during the
first two decades of the twentieth century. Scott and Shackleton
61.

BRIRU.y, supra note 16, at 163.

62. See discussion in text accompanying notes 21-24, supra.
63. See text accompanying notes 82-87, inf ra.
64. ENCYCLOPEDIA BR rANNICA, 1 MACROPABDIA 961 (1974).

65. Id.
66. Id.
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led three expeditions deep into the Antarctic hinterland, with
Scott attaining the South Pole in 1911-1912.67 The Norwegian
Roald Amundsen also reached the Pole in 1911.68 Admiral
Richard Byrd in several expeditions from 1926-1947 introduced
airplanes into Antarctic exploration, and in 1926 was the first
to fly over the Pole.9
The activities which occurred during the early twentieth century led to conflicting claims among seven states to areas of Antarctica, especially in the Palmer Peninsula (Graham Land) area.
However, no permanent settlements or continuous activities colored the claims forwarded until the 1950's-1° Since 1924, it has
been the policy of the United States to refrain from espousing any
claims itself and from recognizing those made by other states, due
71
to the lack of actual settlement in the areas claimed.
Because of the nature to date of Antarctica as terra nullius,
the principal mode of acquisition to territory in the continent has
been occupatio, usually coupled with discovery as previously
stated. As the remaining part of this section will largely concern
this concept, one of fundamental importance in Antarctica, it is
important to understand the nature and reasoning behind the concept. Vattel, in Le Droit des Gens, has given what perhaps is
the best description of the role occupatio performs in international
law:
[Biut it is questioned whether a nation can, by the base act
of taking possession, appropriate to itself countries which it
does not really occupy, and thus engross a much greater extent of territory than it is able to people or cultivate. It is not
difficult to determine that such a pretension would be an absolute infringement of the natural rights of men and repugnant to the views of nature, which, having destined the whole
earth to supply the wants of mankind in general, gives no
nation a right to appropriate to itself a country except for the
purpose of making use of it, and not of hindering others from
deriving advantage from it.72
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Id. at 962.
70. Id. at 962-63.
71. Id. at 963.
72. VATrEL, LE DRorr DES GENs, at 98 (Pitty transl.). Accord, BLUNTscamL, LE DRorr INTERNATIONAL CoDIFIA, at 281 (Landy transl.):
N-o State has the right to incorporate with itself more territory uninhabited or inhabited by barbarous tribes, than it can civilize, or that it
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This analysis emphasizes the basic logic behind the doctrine:
utilizing the resources of territory as efficiently as possible and
permitting only those persons best in a position to utilize them
to do so. The argument has been voiced in connection with the
polar regions however, that due to their distant, inhospitable, and
unique nature, an exception to the general rule should be made.
Smedal replied to this contention:
[I]n the theory and practice of international law it is laid
down that sovereignty over a no man's land must be acquired
by occupation if all the interested powers are not agreed to
place such land under the single State. As mentioned several
times before, there is no valid reason for departing from the
rule in the polar regions. In fact, it cannot be dispensed
with, for it cannot be replaced by any other rule to which the
comity of nations is willing to adhere. There can be no doubt
that the States are unwilling to renounce in the polar regions
the role of occupation."
The occupatio doctrine is the basic mode of acquisition of
territory today, having its origin in the Roman law of property
in which the element of control exercised by the owner was essential. It has enjoyed a steady and continuous development after
its resuscitation by the discovery of the New World and promulgation of the Papal bull Inter Caetera (the latter actually being a
precedent on which certain South American States base their sector claims to Antarctica). 74 The continued emphasis on effective
control, whatever form it may take, has always been present.
According to Oppenheim:
Theory and practice agree nowadays upon the rule that
occupation is effected through taking possession of, and establishing administration over, the territory in the name of, and
for, the acquiring State. Occupation thus effected is real
occupation, and, in contradistinction to fictitious occupation,
is named effective occupation. Possession and administration are the two essential facts that constitute an effective occupation.
can organize politically. The sovereignty of the State exists only if it
is exercised as a fact.
73. SMEDAL, supra note 30, at 64. See OPPENHEIM, supra note 10, at 55463, which continues to concede in the law no exception to the "sole occupation"
test.
74. This Bull, and others issued during the period, may be found in THE
CARNEGIE INSTITUTION,

EUROPEAN TREATIES

UNITED STATES AND ITS DEPENDENCIES

BEARING

ON THE

HISTORY OF THE

(F. Davenport ed. 1917).
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(1) Possession.-The territory must really be taken
into possession by the occupying State ....
(2) Administration.--After having, in the aforementioned way, taken possession of a territory, the possesor must
establish some kind of administration thereon which shows
that the territory is really governed by the new possessor. If,
within a reasonable time after the act of taking possession,
the possessor does not establish some responsible authority
which exercise governing functions, there is then no effective
occupation, since in fact no sovereignty is exercised by any

State over the territory. 75
If, then, we are cognizant of the nature of sovereignty and of occu-

patio, and if we are convinced of the strict applicability of 'the latter to Antarctica, an examination of its basic elements is in order.
B.

The Necessity of State Action

As only states are properly the subject of international law,
only acts of acquisition to territory undertaken by them in their
sovereign capacity or through the acts of their agents, actively and

contemporaneously supported by the state, are recognized by the
family of nations. Regardless of the special bond of nationality existing between a state and its subjects, the latters' discovery and
occupation of terra nullius will not validate subsequent state claims
to such lands without prompt endorsement of them. In the words
of Smedal:
[S]overeignty can only be exercised by a State, not by private persons or companies, e.g., colonization companies. This
fact has not always been clearly recognized. Colonists may,
however, form76their own State, and this State can then exercise authority.

In the case of the United States, all early major discoveries
were the acts of private citizens not officially endorsed at that time
by the United States. The classic statement of positive disavowal
by the United States was made by Secretary of State Hughes in
1924 concerning Admiral Byrd's expedition to the South Pole.

When he presented the South Pole to the United States, the
Secretary of State said:

It is the opinion of the Department that the discovery of lands
unknown to civilization, even when coupled with a formal
75. 1 L OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAw 509-10 (7th ed. 1948).
76. SMEPAL, supra note 30, at 10.
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taking of possession, does not support a valid claim of sovereignty unless the discovery7 is followed by an actual settlement
of the discovered country.
What are the legal consequences of such a course of action? At
best, it could give the United States an inchoate title, a state of
affairs also engendered by the failure of the state effectively to
occupy territory discovered by it.
If, however, -the latter [i.e., a state with inchoate title] omits
to take effective possession of the land during the time in
which the prior right is valid, the land is again considered to
7
be without a master and can be occupied by another State.
Admiral Byrd's 1929 flight over the South Pole and purported attempt to claim the area for the United States, which for many
years thereafter did not man expeditions to the area, has become
a locus classicus as to the effect of an inchoate title by right
of discovery not followed by subsequent occupation or administration. Contemporary comments attendant to Byrd's flight and
purported claim to the Pole show the world's interest and amazement. As one observer said, "he [Byrd] has seen things [the
South Pole lands] as we all have seen the moon."7
The question may arise as to whether subsequent activities
of states whose earlier activities gave rise to inchoate titles can
revalidate the earlier inchoate title. This depends on several
facts. First of all, if in the ensuing interval no second state intervened in the area by way of discovery, administration, or settlement, the problem is academic as subsequent activities of the original state will in themselves revalidate the title, If, however, a
second state did intervene, the inchoate title of the original state,
if not coupled with occupatio, may well have lapsed and have been
superseded. But the same rules would in turn apply to the second
state. The real difficulty appears when an inchoate title established by discovery without settlement or administration by state
77. G. HAcKwoRTH, 1 DIGas'r OF INTERNATIONAL LAw 399 (1940); Letter
from Secretary of State Hughes to A.W. Prescott, May 13, 1924, M.S. DEPT.
STATE file 811. 014/101.
78. SMEDAL, supra note 27, at 48.
79. Dundee Courier and Advertiser, April 6, 1929, cited in SMEDAL, supra
note 30, at 74. Cf. 1 L. OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW 278 (1st ed. 1920)
as to the effect of an inchoate title:
[I]f such period lapses without any attempt by the discovering State to
turn its inchoate title into a real title of occupation, such inchoate title
perishes, and any other State can now acquire the territory by means
of an effective occupatio.
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A is shortly thereafter contested by state B, which also "discovers"
the area. What is the period of grace accorded an inchoate title?
The period varies according to the authority selected. Fauchille
states one year. 80 Some have stated twenty-five. The Russians,
for practical reasons, regard the period an indefinite one, thus repudiating the inchoate title doctrine. As one scholar relates:
The Soviet practice, however, seems to exceed all the other
views. As stated by Professor Kalesnik, the validity of the
prior right, based on Russian discoveries in the Antarctic, is
considered to be valid for more than 130 years. In his own
words:
Russia has never renounced her rights, and the
Soviet government has never given its consent for
anyone to dispose of territory discovered by Russian navigators. 81
C.

Effectiveness of Occupation

Effectiveness of occupation is not only the touchstone on
which all title to territory is based, but also is that element of occupatio which presents the greatest difficulty in analyzing the Antarctic experience. Although conceptually difficult to disassociate
effectiveness of occupation from an integral discussion dealing
with animus occupandi8 2 (evaluted objectively in examining acts
of display of sovereignty), for the purpose of analysis an artificial
dichotomy is made here.
Effectiveness should be viewed as the objective manifestation of a continuous development of control commencing with discovery and subsequent inchoate title and continuing by permanent
settlement and administration. Given the situation prevalent in
Antarctica today, no valid claim to territory can be enjoyed without such effective exercise. In matter of fact, the most difficult
question concerning Antarctic sovereignty is whether or not exceptions should be made for such an inhabitable area and if so,
the form of and degree to which they should be articulated.
Grotius wrote:
80. P. FAUCHILLE, 1 TRAITk DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL PUBLIQUE 720-21

(1925).
81.

P. Toma, Soviet Attitude Towards the Acquisition of TerritorialSover-

eignty in the Antarctic, 50 AM. J. INT'L L. 611, 616-17 (1956) [hereinafter cited
as Tomal (footnote omitted).
82. This term refers to the intcnt to occupy.
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No one is a sovereign of a thing which he himself has never
possessed and which no one else has ever held in his name
...
. To discover a thing is not only to capture it with the
The act of
eyes but to take real possession thereof ....
discovery is sufficient to give a clear title of sovereignty only
when it is accompanied by actual possession.88
In contrast to its antecedent in -the Roman Law of Property,
contemporary effectiveness is generally associated with non-absolute degrees of possession. To maintain that actual continuous
possession is required in a largely uninhabited land is to misconstrue the real nature of occupatio. Effective possession requires
only that degree of control which is necessary under the totality
of the circumstances prevalent in the area to make the presence
of authority of the occupying state felt by and against all others.
It is therefore a flexible and comparative standard:
Effective occupation as generally required does not imply its extension to every nook and corner. -Itis sufficient to
dispose at some places within the territory of such a strong
force that its power can be extended if necessary over the
whole region in order to guarantee a certain minimum of legal
order and legal protection within the boundaries, and to ex84
clude any interference from a third State ....
By far the best philosophical explanation of effective occupation is that of Van der Heydte:
Effectiveness then seems to be best illustrated by actual display of sovereign rights, the maintenance of order, and protection. But as a matter of fact sovereign rights can be exercised only over human beings, in inhabited lands; . . .
and protection too can be granted only to human beings. It
would be a misconstruction of the doctrine of effectiveness to
say that sovereignty over completely uninhabited land presupposes in every case actual occupation. 85
This definition, then, indicates clearly how the scope of effective control over largely uninhabited lands can be circumscribed
without jeopardizing the effectiveness of that control; for political
control is but a relative concept in that a human relationship is
required. Political control over territory cannot be said to exist
without the existence of either a permanent or transient popula83. H. GRoTius, MARE LIBERUM Il 52 (1911).
84. Van der Heydte, Discovery, Symbolic Annexation and Virtual Effectiveness in InternationalLaw, 29 AM. J. INT'L L. 448, 463 (1963).
85. Id.
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tion or occasional influx of human beings. The same principle
applies both to a nation, which cannot exist without a people,
and to the very principle of territorial sovereignty itself, which is
meaningless without reference to the nation-state concept. Thus
it should be kept in mind that when exceptions to the effectiveness principle for Antarctica are discussed, what is really at issue
is not its extreme climate and latitude, but rather its lack of population. This then in itself will vitiate the sector principle, which
is only an inept application and special case of occupatio. Therefore, Soviet jurists are incorrect and fail to observe the real nature
of effective occupation when they maintain that an additional argument in opposition to the principle of "effective occupation" is
the notion that, with regard to occupation of polar areas, it is not
justifiable to maintain the demand for effective occupation. 6
Recent judicial interpretation of the doctrine of occupatio
corroborates this new approach that effective occupation is distinctly governed by the circumstances of each case.
As Waldock states:
[T]he -three cases cited above [Eastern Greenland,Palmas and
Clipperton Island] mark a change in the concept of effective
occupation which has taken place during the past century and
especially since the African Conference of Berlin in 1885.
The emphasis has shifted from the taking of physical possession of the land and the exclusion of others to the manifestation and exercise of the functions of government over
the territory. This change is a natural consequence of the
recognition that in modern international law occupation is

87
the acquisition of sovereignty rather than of property.
The basic elements of occupation just discussed can perhaps
most succinctly be summarized in the words of the Permanent
Court of International Justice in its decision in the Legal Status
of Eastern Greenland: "[A] claim to sovereignty must be based
on two elements: the intention and will to act as a sovereign,
and some actual continued display of such authority."8 8
In applying these coefficients of traditional international law
to the case of United States sovereignty over Antarctic, it can

86. Toma, supra note 81, at 618.
87. Waldock, Disputed Sovereignty in the Falkland Island Dependencies, 25
BlIT. Y. B. INT'L L. 311, 317 (1948) [hereinafter cited as Waldock] (parentheticals added).
88. Legal Status of Eastern Greenland, [1933] P.C.I.J. ser A/B, No. 53,
cited in GREEN, INT'L LAW THROUGH

THE CASES
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be seen that the United States is unable to satisfy either.

First,

it is moot whether or not the United States ever exercised its prerogative by espousing the activities of early United States' discov-

erers and explorers in a timely manner as needed to satisfy the
requirement of state action.8 9 Second, even if the requirements
were met, it is clear that the United States has never had the
animus occupandi requisite to any claim of territorial sovereignty,
in accordance with the first coefficient in the Eastern Greenland
case."' In fact, it has been the consistent policy of the United
States to refrain from making any claims to Antarctica for over
half a century." Third, until recent years the United States refrained from fulfilling the second coefficient of the Eastern Greenland test-actual display of authority. 92 The first really significant official United States-sponsored expedition of any meaningful scope was conducted immediately after the Second World War
in an expedition which far outstripped anything that had earlier
transpired." However, it is questionable whether such presence
89. See text accompanying notes 76 through 79, supra.
90. Legal Status of Eastern Greenland, [19331 P.C.I.J. ser A/B No. 53, at
46.
91. For example, Acting Secretary of State Welles, in a letter dated August
8, 1939, to the diplomatic officers in the American Republics, stated:
The Government of the United States has in the past asserted no
claim of its own to sovereignty over areas in the Antarctic region, although the activities and explorations of its citizens date back considerably more than a century. On the other hand, the United States Government has not recognized the Antarctic sovereignty claims of any
other nation and has made formal reservation of such rights as it or its
citizens may possess in that region.
2 M. WHITEMAN, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 1247 (1963).
Secretary of State Hughes earlier stated:
It is the opinion of the Department that the discovery of lands unknown to civilization, even when coupled with a formal taking of possession, does not support a valid claim of sovereignty unless the discovery
is followed by an actual settlement of the discovered country. In the
absence of an act of Congress assertative in a domestic sense of dominion over Wilkes Land this Department would be reluctant to declare that
the United States possessed a right of sovereignty over that territory.
1 G. HACKWORTH, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 399 (1940). Cf. Hayton, The
'American' Antarctic 50 AM. J. INT'L L. 583 (1958) [hereinafter cited as Hayton]:
At first, ability to perfect title in the polar regions was denied altogether
by some writers. These latitudes were judged completely unsuitable for
the settlement believed required for 'effective occupation.' This remains,
despite occasional or recent signs of vacillation, part of the official
United States position.
Id. at 599 (footnote omitted).
92. Legal Status of Eastern Greenland, [1933] P.C.I.J. ser A/B No. 53, at
46.
93. This refers to the United States Naval Antarctic Developments Project
of 1947. See 2 M. WHITEMAN, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 1248, 1249

(1963).
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actually amounted to the display of authority to which the Permanent Court of International Justice referred. The Court, in referring to the intention and will to act as sovereign, modified that
intention with the words "by some actual exercise or display of
such authority." 4 Thus, the authority exercised must be an exercise of sovereign authority. Any state in theory enjoys, by virtue of the subjective nationality principle, authority over its own
subjects wherever they may be. Thus, United States' assertion
of authority over its nationals in Antarctica, without any attempt
by the United States to exercise authority over foreign nationals,
would in -all probability not fulfill the standard enunciated in the
Eastern Greenland decision. Therefore, the United States practice of "formally reserving such rights as it or its citizens may pos95
sess" in Antarctica is an empty reservation.
D.

Display of Authority and Relaxation of Standards
in PolarRegions

Closely connected to the issue of effectiveness is that of the
display of authority, for display is the tangible expression of effectiveness in sovereignty claims. De Martens has effectively
stated the basic nature of the display of authority required:
[T]he limits of -the occupation are determined by the material possibility to cause to be respected the authority of the
government throughout the extent of the occupied country.
Where 'the power of the state does not make itself felt there
is not an occupation. In order that it may be effective it
must receive its entire execution. 96
Another important factor to bear in mind is that display of
authority is a relative and not an absolute concept; that is, the
requisite degree depends on the activities of other states in the
disputed area. As the Permanent Court of International Justice
enunciated in Eastern Greenland:
[It is impossible to read the records of the decisions in cases
of territorial sovereignty without observing that in many cases
the tribunal has been satisfied with very little in the way of
the actual exercise of sovereign rights, provided that the other
94. Legal Status of Eastern Greenland, [1933] P.C.I.J. ser A/B No. 53, at
46.
95. See Lissitzyn, The American Position on Outer Space and Antarctica,
53 AM. J. INT'L L. 126 (1959).
96. E. DE MARTENS, 1 TRAITg DEDROIT INTERNATIONAL 463 (Alfred Leo
transl. 1802).
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State could not make out a superior claim. This is particularly true in the case of claims to sovereignty over areas in
thinly populated or unsettled countries. 97
The display of authority most often contemplated is that of
administration. With regard to Eastern Greenland, Smedal
wrote:
[W]hether any of -the members of the settlement [in Eastern
Greenland] have been vested with Danish police authority,
and whether inspection and control is exercised in the territory, we do not know. If, however, we assume that there are
persons belonging to the settlement who can be said to represent Danish State authority, and that the surrounding land
is regularly under the inspection of these persons, we are of
the opinion that Danish sovereignty must be recognized. 98
Having described the display of sovereignty principle and the
elements most associated with it, the issue of exceptions to the
general proposition must be further examined. While no one
doubts the validity of the fact that exceptions should be made,
the question is the degree to which the exceptions should extend,
an issue which, in the Antarctic situation particularly, has been
the subject of excess and abuse.
Any attempt to alter the formula of effective occupation because of special geographic and climatic conditions can be of
only dubious value. It would seem that any territorial title,
whether based on original discovery or the "sector principle,"
in the absence of effective occupation, would tend to widen
rather than bridge the gap between reality and law.99
Smedal is of the same opinion with regard to polar areas in
particular:
97. Legal Status of Eastern Greenland, [19331 P.C.I.J. ser A/B No. 53
at 46. Brierly, in commenting on this decision, states:
On this they pointed out [the Court] that the absence of any competing claim by another State (and until 1931 no State other than Denmark had ever claimed title to Greenland) is an important consideration; a relatively slight exercise of authority will suffice when no state
can show a superior claim. They held, too, that the character of the
country must be regarded; the arctic and inaccessible nature of the uncolonized parts of Greenland made it unreasonable to look for a continuous
or intensive exercise of authority.
BRIERLY, supra note 16, at 164.
98. SMEDAL, supra note 30, at 127. Cf. Hayton, supra note 91, at 590:
Argentina fully realizes that administrative organization of territory is
considered a major act of sovereignty in the perfection and maintenance
of titles.
99. Hayton, supra note 91, at 606. (Quoting Svarlien) (emphasis in original).
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We would at once point out that, in our opinion, it is, broadly
speaking, not the case that other rules than those applying to
occupation in other parts of the world would apply to occupations in polar regions. When the rules are to be applied in
polar regions, however, questions of a special nature may
arise.

10 0

For perspective, it should be observed that when the issue
of sovereign claims in Antarctica first presented itself at the beginning of the present century, the fact that climatic conditions in
the continent precluded the possibility of any permanent Antarctic
settlement was for many writers conclusive of the issue:
[A]s the regions of both the North and South Poles are incapable of permanent settlement, they do not appear to be
"territory" susceptible of acquisition by occupation.1 0'
In the same year in which Hall rendered the above view, Secretary of State Hughes unwittingly tied the hands of future U.S.
policy makers and stated, in agreement with Hall:
It is the opinion of this Department that the discovery of
lands unknown to civilization, even when coupled with a formal taking of possession, does not support a valid claim of
sovereignty unless ,the discovery is followed by an actual settlement of the discovered countries. -Inthe absence of an act
of Congress assertative in a domestic sense of dominion over
Wilkes Land the Department would be reluctant to declare
that the United States possessed a right of sovereignty over
10 2
that territory.
The international thought on the subject, no doubt abetted
by the technological advance in explorative techniques and the introduction of aerial navigation to the field in 1926 by Admiral
Byrd, was soon to change. As Hayton wrote:
100. SMEDAL, supra note 30, at 68.
L'OCCUPATION COMME MODE D'ACQU§RIR

Cf. G. JEzE, 8TUDE TioRIQUE SUR
LES TERRITOIRES EN DROIT INTERNA-

(1896):
[W]hen, therefore, effective possession is rightly demanded also in polar
regions as a condition of occupation, it should be realized that the reme-

TIONAL

dies necessary for submitting a limit onto the control of a State will not
be the same in all cases.

101. W. HALL, A
Cf. I L. OPPENHEIM,

TREATISE ON INTERNATIONAL LAW, 103 n.1
INTERNATIONAL LAw 450 (4th ed. 1928)

(7th ed. 1924);
who states that

the taking of possession with the intention of acquiring sovereignty can only be
done by a settlement on the territory.
102. 1 G. HACKWORTH, A DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAw 399 (1940); Letter
from Secretary of State Hughes to A.W. Prescott, May 13, 1924, Department of
State file 811.014/101.
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[Slubsequently, [to 1924] however, the presence intermittently of official personnel or licensed commercial enterprises,
for example, during the summer months, was deemed sufficient . ...
At the same time, less exacting standards were
introduced for uninhabited desolate or polar regions. Title
could be completed with acts of sovereignty of less frequency
and less magnitude. Each case apparently must be judged
on its own merits. 10 8
Concomitantly, the new approach received its initial judicial approbation internationally in Max Huber's Arbitral Award in the
Island of Palmas:
[M]anifestations of territorial sovereignty assume, it is true,
different forms, according to conditions of time and place. Although continuous in principle, sovereignty cannot be exerccised in fact at every moment on every point of a territory. The
intermittence and discontinuity compatible with the maintenance of the right necessarily differ according as inhabited or
uninhabited regions are involved, or regions enclosed within
territories in which sovereignty is uncontestably displayed, or
again regions accessible from, for instance, the high seas.
If, however, no conventional line of sufficient topographical
precision exists, or if there are gaps in the frontiers otherwise established, or if a conventional line leaves room for
doubt, or if, as for example, in the case of an island situated
in the high seas, the question arises whether a title is valid
erga omnes, the actual continuous and peaceful display of
State functions is in case of dispute
the sound and natural cri10 4
terium of territorial sovereignty.
Judge Huber thus was the first to circumscribe the exceptions doctrine by putting relative bounds on it. Hence, exceptions notwithstanding, the minimum degree of effective control required
to perfect title with such relaxed standards would be the actual
continuous and peaceful display of state functions.
The decision received further judicial endorsement in the
Clipperton IslandArbitral Award:
It is beyond doubt that by immemorial usage having the
force of law, . . . the actual, and not the nominal, taking of
possession is a necessary condition of occupation. This tak103. Hayton, supra note 91, at 599.
104. Island of Palmas Case, Hague Court Reports 2d (Scott), 83, at 92, 94
(Penn. Ct. Arb.), 2 U.N.R.I.A.A. 829 (1928).
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ing of possession consists in the act, . . by which the occupying state reduces to its possession the territory in question and
takes steps to exercise exclusive authority there. Strictly
speaking, and in the ordinary case, that only takes place
when the state establishes in the territory itself an organization capable of making its laws respected. But this step is
. . .but a means of procedure to the taking of possession,

and, therefore, is not identical with the latter. There may
also be cases where it is unnecessary to have recourse to this
method. Thus, if a territory, by virtue of the fact that it was
completely uninhabited, is, from the first moment when the
occupying state makes its appearance there, at the absolute
and undisputed disposition of that state, from that moment
the taking of possession must be considered as accomplished,
and the occupation is thereby completed. 10 5
The arbiter thus prescribed a further condition to the new approach. In addition to Huber's "actual, continous, and peaceful
display of State function,"10 6 Victor Emmanuel, arbiter in the
Clipper Island Arbitration, stated that, in the case of terra nullius,
if the land is "at the absolute and undisputed disposition of that
State, 110°7 then "from that moment the taking of possession must
be considered as accomplished, and the occupation thereby com' 08
plete.' 1
Applying these two judicial criteria to Antarctic history, can
any single state claim to have perfected title before entry into force
of the treaty regime? The answer would clearly be in the negative. Until the treaty regime, no state was able to assert a continuous display of authority in Antarctica throughout the year, and
by the time effective year-long occupation was achieved, its concomitant, peaceful and uncontested display, had been ruled out
-by competing claims of other states. In applying the Clipperton
criteria to Antarctica, the dangers inherent in applying formulae
developed for a particular geographical entity (such as an island)
to another area (such as 'a continent) must be recognized. While
Clipperton Island is completely isolated and uninhabited, small,
and capable of effective territorial occupation and administration'
105. Clipperton Island Arbitral Award (Italy v. Clipperton Island) (1931)
in 26 AM. J.INT'L L 390, 393-94 (1932).
106. Island of Palmas Case, Hague Court Reports 2d (Scott), 83, at 94
(Perm. Ct. Arb.), 2 U.N.R.I.A.A. 829 (1928).

107. Clipperton Island Arbitral Award (Italy v. Clipperton Island) (1931) in
26 AM. J. INT'L L. 390, 394 (1932).
108. Id. at 394.
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in its entirety with only a few official representatives, the occupation of a continent is not amenable to so cavalier a treatment. In
any case it could not be said that Antarctica was ever "at the absolute and undisputed disposition"' 9 of any state within the present century, given the many diverse and often simultaneous expeditions mounted there. It therefore fails to fulfill the exceptions enunciated in the Palmasand ClippertonIsland decisions.
The only acceptable "exception", if indeed it can be classified as such, would be the degree of administration which would
be found sufficient to perfect title. This was recognized as a
varying standard in the Legal Status of Eastern Greenland case,
the major international decision concerning effective occupation
previously discussed. It has been commented that despite the extreme leniency shown by the Permanent Court of International
Justice in the Eastern Greenland case, authority in the Antarctic
must be exercised at least as and when the occasion demands." 0
In formulating this standard, the court endorsed -the view maintained by the Allies after the First World War as expressed in
the Treaty of St. Germain-en-Laye: that the territories in question, that is, those primarily in the former Austro-Hungarian Empire, "are provided with administrative institutions suitable to the
1
local conditions."'
Further support for -this position was exhibited by Lindley
during the inter-war years:
[W]hat is sufficient will depend on all the circumstances. If
the territory contains a large population or is one to which a
good many traders resort, elaborate administrative machinery
may be necessary. If, on the other hand, it is remote or small
or incapable of accommodating more than a small or transitory population, a rudimentary organization may be all that
is required; while in the case of small islands used merely
for the purpose of a particular business, such as the catching
109. Id.
110. Waldock, supra note 87, at 334 et. seq. The only authority who has
rejected the necessity of administration as a manifestation of effective occupation
snd necessary means of perfecting title to polar territories has been Toma (and

to some extent Lakhtine):
An additional argument in opposition to the principle of 'effective
occupation,' advanced by the Soviet jurists, is the notion that, with regard to occupation of polar areas, it is not justifiable to maintain the
demand for effective possession.
Toma, supra note 81, at 618 (citing Molodtsov).
111. Soci~t6 des Nations. VIII RECUEUIL
-ith Austria-Hungary. 42 Stat. 106 (1919).
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of guano, the presence of an
or curing of fish or the collecting 12
official or two may be sufficient.'
Finally, Smedal specifically endorsed this approach with reference
to Antarctica:
[Flor occupation in polar regions, there will not at present
be any question of using military force. These regions are so
sparsely peopled that orderly conditions can be maintained by
much more simple measures. 113
In summary, the only broadly accepted exception to the effective occupation doctrine is effective administration. While it
is true that permanent settlement of polar regions is no longer an
indispensable adjunct to perfecting sovereign title to territory in
those areas, administration must still be adequate under the totality of the circumstances. Although this is not a satisfactory and
easily applicable standard on which to conclude, the inherent inability to enunciate a,more precise doctrine is evident.
VI.

THE SECTOR PRINCIPLE

The sector principle is the one non-conventional mode of acquisition of territory in international law which is used to support
the claims of some states in the Antarctic. However, it is submitted that regardless of the postures assumed by many of the
treaty claimants, the sector principle is misapplied to Antarctica.
First, it is an unjustified application of an Arctic principle itself
misconstrued historically by the original proponents. Second, its
modem application is based on what amounts to imperfect application in varying degrees of the occupatio mode. Finally, it is
misapplied because where the sector principle is based on the continuity, contiguity, or Hinterland principle, these latter modes of
claim, while espoused during the nineteenth century, are now rejected as valid principles in international law.
The Soviets have defined polar sectors as:
[P]olar territories, delimited by definite co-ordinates, while
all lands and islands within the sector, clear to the Pole, are
considered the territory of the State which claims the sector
as its own. The apex of the sector is the Pole, the lateral
boundaries [are] determined by longitude (from the pole to
the eastern and western borders of the corresponding State),
the arc [is] someone's coastline or a certain parallel latitude.1 1 4
112.
113.
114.

Waldock, supra note 87, at 336 (citing Lindley).
SMEDAL, supra note 30, at 34.
Mezhdunarodnoe Pravo GOSUDARSTVENNOE IEDATEL'STUO YURIDICHESKOI

LITERATURY, INTERNATIONAL LAW 269 (1951).
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The supposed historic underpinnings of the sector principle were
embodied in the 1825 Treaty between the United States and Russia," 5 the pertinent language of which was reincorporated in article 1 of the 1867 Treaty Concerning the Cession of the Russian
Possessions in North America by His Majesty the Emperor of All
the Russias to the United States of America.'1 6 Article 1 of that
treaty provides that the eastern limit of Russian territory with that
of'United States (Alaskan) territory is as described in articles 3
and 4 of the 1825 Convention:
[C]ommencing from the southernmost point of the island
called Prince of Wales Island, which point lies in the parallel
of 54 degrees 40 minutes north latitude, and between the
131st and 133rd degree of west longitude (meridian of
Greenwich), the said line shall ascend to the north along the
channel called the Portland Channel . . . and finally, from
the said point of intersection, the said meridian line of the
141st degree, in its prolongation as far as the Frozen
Ocean. 117
Whereas the English text "as far as the Frozen Ocean" is ambiguous in that we do not know the extent of the term "as far
as," the French parallel text fortunately leaves no doubt. It provides that the meridian line envisaged at the time did not continue right up to the North Pole through the frozen Arctic, but
rather stopped at the ice barrier." 8 It can readily be appreci'ated that if this is the historical basis of Arctic sector claims, such
as those posited by Russia and Canada, the basis is a poor one
indeed. 19
115. Convention as to the Pacific Ocean and Northwest Coast of America,
signed April 17, 1824, 8 Stat. 302, T.S. 298 (effective January 11, 1825).
116. Convention ceding Alaska, signed March 30, 1867, 15 Stat. 539, T.S. 301
(effective June 29, 1867).
117. Convention as to the Pacific Ocean and Northwest Coast of America,
signed April 17, 1824, 8 Stat. 302, T.S. 298, art. 3, 4 (effective January 11, 1825).
118. The French text states, "et finalement du dit point d'intersection la
m~me ligne meridienne du 141 me degr6 formera, dans son prolongement jusqu'b
]a mer glaciale, .... " (emphasis added). Taking the primary meaning of the
French "jusqu'A" as "up to" rather than "as far as," the meaning of the phrase
becomes clear.
The author acknowledges with thanks the contribution of Mr. Gerald Schatz
of the National Academy of Sciences who noted this textual dissimilarity between
the two texts and provided him with a draft text of his article, Transnational Science and Technology in the Absence of Defined Sovereignty; Developments in
the Polar Regions and in Legally Similar Situations, appearing in G. SCHATZ,
SCIENCE, TECHNOLOGY AND SOVEREIGNTY IN THE POLAR REGIONS (1974).
119. Smedal indicates that such is indeed the case:
[A]s a special argument in favor of the sector claim of the SOviet
Union, reference has been made to the Treaty between the United States
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The state responsible for enunciating the sector principle in
its modem context was Canada. On February 20, 1907, N.P.
Poirier, a Canadian Senator, recommended to the Senate that
Canada should declare it had taken possession of the lands and
islands lying between its northern coast and the North Pole. 2 '
This direct reference to the North Pole with respect to area claims
of the Arctic led to a proliferation of other claims, including the
Russian (Sturmer) Declaration of December 20, 1916,11 which
gave notice to the allied and friendly powers that Russia laid claim
to several Arctic islands' 2 which formed a northern extension
3
of the Siberian continental mainland.12
and Russia of 1867. In this Treaty it was stipulated that the boundary
between the two States shall be the aforesaid meridian . . . and it is
stated with regard to the boundary that it '. . remonte en ligne direct
,[sic] sans limitation, vers le Nord jusqu'A ce qu'elle perde dans la Mer
Glacial. [sic]'
SMEDAL, supra note 30, at 80. The French text cited by Smedal re-emphasizes
the earlier conclusion as to meaning of "jusqu'h" for a meridian which "loses
itself" or "disappears" when it reaches the "frozen seas" is hardly to be construed
as one intended in the minds of its drafters as ending in the North Pole. Cf.
SMEDAL,

supra note 30, at 66-7:

1Inn favor of the Canadian sector claim, a special reason has been stated
which does not apply to sector claims generally. Reference has been
made to the Treaty between Russia and Great Britain of 1825 relating
to the boundary line between Alaska and Canada, where the expression
is used that the meridian 141 degrees west shall be the boundary line
'right up to the Arctic' (jusqu'A la Mer Glacial). Whether this term
means 'to where the Arctic begins.' or, 'as far as the Arctic extends,'
is perhaps not quite clear, but the former interpretation seems to be the
right one. If the term is understood to mean that a division of the Arctic
regions was made by the Treaty, the division was in that event a matter
between Great Britain and Russia which foreign States are not bound
to respect if they have not consented to it.
Although not discussed in the article, it is clear that Smedal's last observation
would weaken the historic argument even further by any application or construction of the principle res inter alios acta. See also PHAR&ND, supra note 30, at
87:
More specifically, is the sector theory, invoked by Senator Pascal Poirier
in 1907 in support of Canada's claim to Arctic islands north of the mainland, to be relied upon now to claim sovereignty right up to the Pole?
On this point it might be recalled that Prime Minister Trudeau stated,
in reply to a question in the House of Commons on March 10, 1969,
that in his opinion, the sector theory did not apply to the waters or ice.
This opinion is quite sound, considering the physical realities of the Arctic Ocean (footnotes omitted).
Id.
120. [1906-07] Debates of the Senate of the Dominion of Canada, 226-73
(1907).
121. See Lakhtine, supra note 24, at 708.
122. E.g., Wilkitski, Czar Nicholas II, Tsarevich Alexsi Island, Starokademski
and Novopashenni Islands and Henrietta, Jeannette, Bennett, Herald and Ouiedinenie, New Siberia and Wrangel.
123. See Lakhtine, supra note 24, at 708. A claim reasserted by the Russian
Soviet Federated Socialist Republic by a Special Memorandum of November 4,
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The British were the first to apply the principle to the Antarctic, promulgating the British declaration on the Falkland Sector of March 28, 1917, which, in Letters Patent of March 28,
1917, stated that the dependencies in question were deemed to
include all islands and territories whatsoever between Longitude
20.000 W and 50.00' W, south of Latitude 50.00 ° S, and between Longitude 50.000 W and 80.000 W, south of Latitude
58.000 S.124 Great Britain made a further sector decree in 1923,
pursuant to Order in Council of July 30, 1923, stating that Ross
Sector included all islands and territories between Longitude
160.00' E and 156.000 W, south of Latitude 60.000 S. 125 However,
as in the Canadian example, it was stated that "Ross Sea must be
considered to be part of the high seas, and it is not necessary to
have a concession in order to carry on whaling there.' 26
The Soviets, while not recognizing sector claims in the Antarctic, have consistently maintained their initial claims in the Arctic. They have referred to the British examples already cited in
substantiation of their own sector, maintaining that the reaffirmation of 19,26 was based on the British, Falkland, and Ross sectors. 1 27 Lakhtine goes equally far in concluding:
The question, then, of the legal status of the undiscovered arctic territories may be regarded as solved not only as a
theory but by positive law. That is to say, the said lands and
islands being still undiscovered are already presumed to belong to the nationalterritory of the adjacent PolarState in the
sector of the region of attraction in which they are to
1 28
be found.
Whatever the contentions of the various claimants may be, it must
be pointed out that no matter what the purported extent of these
several claims may be, a handful of states cannot legally contravene or nullify a well-established principle of law.
Another fundamental must be recognized in using Arctic sec1924 (both as to the above islands and as to the eastern boundaries of the 1867
Convention). The Soviet Decree of April 15, 1926, used similar language as its
predecessors, stating: "toutes terres et iles d6ecouvertes ou qui pourraient 6tre
d6couvertes l'avenir." Id. at 711.
124. SMEDAL, supra note 30, at 75.
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. BRnrrFuss, DIE TERRITORIALE SEETORENEINVERTEILUNG DER ARrI1s iM
ZUSAMmENHANG Mrr DEm zu ERWARTENDEN TR

&1NTARKTiSCHENLuFvERKm,

at28 (1928). See also Toma, supra note 81, at 620.
128. Lakhtine, supra note 24, at 711.
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tors as a benchmark in comparing them to Antarctic counterparts.
First, as pointed out in the earlier discussion, the Arctic is a frozen
ice cap without any geologic basement, whereas Antarctica is
quite the opposite. Second, and perhaps most significantly, given
the true nature of the sector theory, no continental mainland exists
at any point near the Antarctic coasts, the nearest one being in
South America at the Cape of Good Horn, opposite Palmer Peninsula, many hundreds of sea miles away. Were it not for this
fortuitous conjunction of two opposing peninsulas, the nearest
continental mainland would be hundreds of miles even further
away.
In comparing the two regions, it is significant to note that
a Russian, Molodtsov, stated clearly that "it would be a mistake -to anticipate that the sector system should also be extended
to the Antarctic."' 29 This statement was in large part based on
geographic continuity and the socio-economic implication that
such proximity naturally entailed:
[T]hese claims were justified as extensions northward to the
pole of continental land masses which already project into
the Arctic Circle. . . . In the Antarctic region there is no
well-established State with a land mass extending into the
Antarctic Circle and no islands offshore which a State could
claim unto itself. In the Antarctic there is an isolated continent and each State claiming land there has chosen an area
defined by longitudinal lines drawn from the South Pole at an
angle sufficiently large to cover the continental territory cov13 0
ered.
Such geographical contiguity was associated with certain natural
socio-economic consequences which are completely lacking in the
Antarctic example:
[]n the north there are narrow "ice" seas . . . close to the
population centers of Europe and America, representing for
the coast lands, aside from an economic, also a strategic interest . . . . In the south, there is a special ice-bound unpopulated continent . . . distant from population centers
181

Smedal, in reviewing the facts marshalled above, rejects
whatever substantiation there may exist in international law sup129. Toma, supra note 81, at 619 (citing Molodstov) (footnote omitted).
130. Id.
131. V. DURDENEVSKY, THE PROBLEM OF THE LEGAL STATUS IN THE POLAR
REGIONS 111-114 (Moscow University, July, 1950).
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porting the application of the rationale of Arctic sector claims to
sector claims in the Antarctic:
[T]urning now to the Antarctic regions, we find that no State
has a territory continuing so far to the south that it is cut by
the polar circle; nor is there, so far to the south, any territory
effectively taken possession of by any State. It should therefore not be possible to make a sector claim, if it be based on
18 2
the same foundation as used in the Arctic regions.
Two other rationales lend support to this conclusion. First
is a socio-ecnomic fact earlier enunciated by the Russians in differentiating the two antipodes. Although perhaps no longer valid,
it involves the state experience in the Arctic. "The . . .line of
reasoning is that only States subjacent to polar regions are sufficiently experienced to be equipped for work in the Arctic."1'33
This, of course, would not apply -to the Antarctic. The other point
is a policy reason, similar to the occupatio rationale, which explains why the sector principle should not be accorded status:
[T]he sector principle is not a legal principle having a title in
the law of nations. This is partly admitted by those who uphold it. Nor should the principle be embodied in international law, for one reason because it aims at a monopoly which will doubtless delay, and partly prevent, any exploitation of the polar regions. 18 4
It should further be observed that evert were the fundamental differences not present, the Antarctic would not be suited
to sector claims. For unlike the Arctic, the Antarctic has been,
and promises to be, the center of increasing human endeavors of
a permanent nature. Such presence would augur illfor states
whose claims are not furthered by their effective presence in the
continent. Even were sector claims recognized as inchoate titles,
the activities of other states would render the later claims null and
void. Further, the sectors themselves as presently constituted are
contradictory and impractical:
[I]n the Antarctic regions the basis of sector claims, as previously mentioned, is not clear. If we assume discoveries to
be a consistent basis and let the State that can refer to discoveries plot their respective sectors on the map, we shall undoubtedly soon realize that principle is not practical; for the
132. SMEDAL, supra note 30, at 58.
133. PARACouzioK, SOVIETS IN THE ARCTIC 323 (1928)
134. SMEDAL, supra note 30, at 64.
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sectors will, in part, cover each other. A territory may lie in
more than one sector. 188
It is equally indefensible that a special sector regime should
be established for the polar regions due to their inaccessible nature. Although discussed at some length under special exceptions
to occupatio, the same exception theory has been utilized as 'the
basis for the sector theory. It should suffice to point out that on
no other terrestrial area of the earth have exceptions to the traditional modes of acquisition to territory been forwarded, no matter
how inaccessible or inhospitable the area may be. The Sahara
and the Himalayas are two excellent examples of this fact. In
neither instance has some distant state been able to enter a claim
to either area by a watered-down concept of acquisition; rather,
the adjacent and surrounding states have asserted sovereignty over
them by effective control and by propinquity thereto. The beauty
of the inherent flexibility of occupatio and its adaptability to such
circumstances is yet another reason for its application to Antarctica.
The two bases underyling all sector claims, no matter what
theoretical base may be voiced in their support, is hopefully clear
at this juncture. It is simply a recasting of the occupatio regime.
This apparent fact is emphasized by the later action of sector
claimants within their sectors:
[I]t is of interest to observe how States that claim sovereignty
in sector areas nevertheless attempt to take charge of lands
lying in those areas by effective occupation. By so doing
they show they fully realize that a territorial sovereignty
which they may rightfully require to be respected by foreign
States must be based on a more solid foundation than the
sector principle.186

Thus, it can be concluded that the sector principle has not achieved
the status of a legal principle in international law. However, it
is possible that with the passage of time the principle may by custom become an accepted one. But as pointed out earlier, the
practice of only a few States of the international community will
37
not create a change in the international legal norm.
135. id. at 62-3.
136. Cf. Dundee Courier and Advertiser, April 6, 1929, cited in SMEDAL, SUpra note 30, at 74.
137. Cf. Hayton, supra note 91, at 606-07. But see Waldock, supra note 87,
at 338; Reeves, Antarctic Sectors, 33 AM. J. INr'L L. 519 (1939):
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VII.

OTHER RELATED THEORIES AND THE
QUESTION OF EXTENT

As stated earlier, the sector theory has 'been based on other
independent theories, the principle ones being contiguity, continuity, the hinterland, uti possidetis, national patrimony, and the
"region of attraction." Some are developments of the past century, while others were first enunciated in the present one. Most
are in themselves related, and often confused in the minds of their
proponents. At times they are used interchangeably. With the
exception of uti possidetis or national patrimony theories, it is submitted that as in -the case of the sector principle, all have as their
true basis the effective occupation rationale. For the sake of
analysis each theory has been treated individually. However, it
must be pointed out that much interplay and overlap exists not
only among those principles under discussion, but also with the
sector principle.
A. Contiguity Doctrine
The contiguity principle was sired during the colonial period
of the past century. 1 8 When states laid down claims to new
lands, as particularly in Africa -after the 1880's, they did so initially on the strength of lands on the coasts of the areas claimed.
As the security needs of coastal settlements required protection
from incursions from adjacent coastal islands, it became a recognized custom among the imperial powers that such islands would
be taken as subsumed under the power of the coastal occupying
power. This entente was in reality a revival of an earlier practice
whereby a discovering state claimed all islands along the coasts
of the new land, and is attested to in the colonial charters granted
by the English Crown to the American Colonies in the seventeenth -andeighteenth centuries.
A perfect example of this trend was an exchange of notes
November 2, 1911, between Secretary of State Lansing and Viscount Ishii, Ambassador of Japan:
Whatever may be the economic and strategic factors ultimately to be disclosed, the adoption of the sector principle may assist greatly in the regulation and preservation of the whale industries. The United States has
shown its interests in the matter by its ratification of the temporary
treaty for the regulation of whaling. One may assert that the sector
principle as applied at least to Antarctica is now a part of the accepted
international legal order.
Id. at 521.
138. See notes 139 and 140, infra.
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The Governments of the United States and Japan recognize that territorial propinquity creates special relations between countries, and consequently, the Government of the
United States recognizes that Japan has special interests in
China, particularly in the part to which her possessions are
contiguous.18 9
However, even in the nineteenth century it was understood as part
of the entente that the islands had to be within some reasonable
distance from the eoast in order to be included within -the contiguous area:
Peru, following a suggestion of Lord Palmerston in 1834, asserted the proximity of the Lobos Islands to Peru would give
her a prima facie claim to them, although they were over
twenty miles distant. A similar basis was offered by Venezuela as a claim to the Ayes Islands, by Haiti to Navassa,
and among others, by Spain and later Argentina to the Falklands, although the latter are almost 250 miles from the mainland. All of these claims give rise to considerable controversy, the result of which seems to support Mr. Fish's contention in the Navassa case that the utmost to which the ar-

gument amounts "is a claim to a constructive possession, or
rather to a right of possession; but in contemplation of international law such claim of a right to a possession is not
enough to establish 0the right of a nation to exclusive terri14
torial sovereignty.'
Lakhtine offers a second rationale in favor of contiguity.
While supporting the theory's application to the Arctic areas, he
injected it with a new rationale:
139. Wright, TerritorialPropinquity, 12 AM. J.

INT'L

L. 519 (1918)

[herein-

after cited as Wright]. And further:
In its recognition of territorial propinquity, the Lansing-Ishii agreement does not stand alone. An inspection of the cases shows then that
they may be classified according as geographic proximity has been mentioned to justify (1) the annexation of territory, (2) the enjoyment of
special economic privileges, (3) the exercise of extraterritorial jurisdic-

tion, or (4) the protection of special political interests.

Id.
140. Id. Cf. Cole, supra note 43, at 40:
lDjuring the period when the colonial powers recognized the creation
of sovereignty by discovery and symbolic annexation, it was considered

sufficient to claim an entire continuous region by symbolic annexation,
by symbolic acts performed at some place along the coast of the new
territory. Even after the need for effective occupation and settlement
appeared the practice of States evolved various doctrines of constructive
occupation of new areas based on the idea that extension of sovereignty
to surrounding territory was incidental to the natural development of the
settlement and was necessary for its military protection. This is known
as the doctrine of continuity; where the same principle was applied to
the islands offshore but beyond the territorial waters the doctrine was
contiguity.
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The first is that no other proper apportionment of the Arctic
can effectively be made. The second line of reasoning is that

experionly states subjacent to polar regions are sufficiently
141
enced to be equipped for work in the Arctic.
A third, more modem reason given in justification of the
contiguity principle is a socio-economic one: that the contiguous
mainland depends on offshore islands for subsistence. However,
it would be difficult to make this argument for the Antarctic as
Molodtsov indicates:
[Tihe Arctic has also an exclusive . . . economic value:
For the population of the Arctic States the Arctic regions represent sources of existence. Therefore, the Arctic territories
are inseparable from their base, that is, the territory of the
adjoining State. The Antarctic regions, however, do not
possess such a base and, therefore, cannot have such economic importance for any one of the world States, which certain regions of the Arctic may have for each of the adjoining
countries.

142

The closest possible argument that could be made would be in
favor of Chile and Argentina. However, the Palmer Peninsula
is so remote and divorced from any traditional economic connection of any standing with either country as to render any proponent argument almost negligible.
In summation, the contiguity principle should be seen only
as an expression of effective occupation, having no intrinsic merit
per se. Van De Heydte, arguendo, states:
[I]f one considers on the contrary the so-called rule of contiguity to be the necessary consequence of a logical interpretation of the very principle of effectiveness and only a special
case of applying that general principle, then one cannot regard geographic contiguity as conferring only an inchoate sovereign title. One has to admit that geographic continguity
full and perfect soverwith an occupied region gives the same
1 48
eign rights as any actual occupation.
But in conclusion he states unequivocably:
The natural boundary lines of any application of the rule of
contiguity are drawn, precisely, by its very origin from the
general principle of effectiveness. Admitting the existence
of such a rule, we only assert the existence of an individual
141. Toma, supra note 81, at 620 (citing Lahktine).
142. S. MOLODTSOV, SOUREMENNOE MEZHDUNARODNO-PRAVOVOE
ANTARKTII

POLOZIIENIE

(Contemporary International Legal Status of the Antarctic) 36-7

(1954).
143. Van der Heydte, supra note 84, at 470.
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case of applying the principle of virtual effectiveness as defined above. It is proper, therefore, to speak of contiguity
144
only as far as one can speak also of virtual effectiveness.
Finally, it must be recognized that an adjacent state's application of the contiguity principle to Antarctica, even were it not to
founder on the great distances involved, would be inapposite in
that -the contiguity principle has traditionally embraced islands
with continental coastlines. In the Antarctic example, it is either
a projection of a continental coast to a continent or, conceptually
worse, a projection from an island or islands to a continent. Applying the contiguity principle to the Antarctic would be an unwarranted extension of an already overstretched idea.
The Russians, in their sector decrees already discussed, specifically related their claims to the then undiscovered Arctic Islands. The Russian decree of September 20, 1916, claimed islands north of Siberia because they "formed a northern extension
of the Siberian continental upland."'' 45 With the Russian minority view apart, the contiguity principle has now for all practical
purposes fallen into desuetude and has no adherents in modern
international law. In the Palmas Island Arbitral Award, it was
stated, "the title of contiguity, understood as a basis of territorial
sovereignty, has no foundation in international law."' 1 6
B.

Continuity and Hinterland

Continuity and Hinterland are nearly identical principles and
must be discussed together. They are of all the theories in this
section the ones most intimately related to the issue of how far
a settlement should extend inward. The only substantial differentiating feature between the two is that one has been applied in
a majority of cases to claims in the temperate zones, the other
to claims in the polar regions.
Generally speaking, both theories maintain -that coastal settlements extend inward for varying reasons whether or not they
144. Id. See his earlier comment, id., at 468:
Yet to a more thorough observation, the so-called rule of contiguity
(Grundsatz der Geographischen Enheit) is in no way opposed to the
general principle of effectiveness, but it is on the contrary the logical
consequence and natural application of that very principle in its intrinsic
sense.

145. Lakhtine, supra note 24, at 708.
146. Palmas (Miangas) Island Arbitral Award, 22 AM. J. INT'L L. 867

(1928).
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are occupied. It was contended that when a state took possession
of a territory, it obtained sovereignty over the adjacent areas as
1 47
being of importance for the occupying territories.
The question of penetration of the interior of a new continent
arose as early as -the American colonial era and the early years
of the Republic when the frontier boundaries of the former American colonies were found administratively inadequate to deal with
westward expansion. 148 On the basis of estuarine occupation, the
former American colonies, having attained independence, claimed
sovereignty over the entire area in which the rivers, tributaries,
and estuaries ran to the watersheds of such rivers, often including
areas in the Appalachian and Blue Ridge Mountains several hundred miles inland. In similar manner the United States, in registering territorial claims with Spain after the Louisiana Purchase,
forwarded the proposition that in demarcating portions of the
Louisiana boundary, settled coastline areas extended inland up to
49
the watershed of all rivers emptying into the coastline.
As under the contiguity principle, the necessity for defense
was also given in justification, as "effective occupation of a territory makes the sovereignty of the possessor extend over the neighbouring territories as far as is necessary for the integrity, security,
and defense of the land actually occupied."' 5 0
The burgeoning of the principle was primarily associated
with the last quarter of the nineteenth century, and an examination of its history in these decades is revealing. Again, as with
the contiguity principle, the political etiquette of the colonial era
dictated the establishment of some practical norm to govern the
post-Berlin Conference land rush. As the interior of the dark
continent proved difficult to penetrate, avoidance of rivalries
among the occupying Powers gave rise to the emergence of the
continuity/Hinterland principle in a meaningful way. As stated
'by Smedal:
[W]hen the States, because of the demands for efficient occupation, were prevented from approaching territories which
they did not control, it became usual in the nineteenth cen147. SMEDAL, supra note 30, at 43.
by Toma, supra note 81, at 620:

See also the definition of "Hinterland"

"Hinterland" is generally understood to mean the land behind a coast,
and not areas stretching from the continent towards the sea.
148. SMEDAL, supra note 30, at 43.
149. 1 L. OPPENHEIM, INTRrMATIONAL LAw 511-512 (7th ed. 1948).
150. Id. at 512.
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tury to conclude agreements relative to so-called "spheres of
influence and interest." Such a sphere means a territory in
which a foreign State is politically interested. A contributory
cause of the making of such conventions was the desire to
evade conflicts. The States, for instance, agreed on dividing
an unoccupied territory between themselves in such a way
that each of them renounced its exercise of political influence
in the part of the territory which was reserved to the other
party. Frequently, the territory was situated behind a coast
already occupied and it was called Hinterland. This term is
also used to designate any sphere of interest.1 ,5
Far from becoming an accepted principle of international law,
tacit compromises reached by the states in such cases were merely
administrative agreements, never elevated to any more encompassing treatment.
The effect of exclusion of the continuity concept from the
corpus of the law was evident in the Declaration of the West African Conference of 1885 emanating from the Berlin Congress of
the same year:
The present law, in view of the generally accepted Declaration of the West African Conference of 1885, would seem
to justify no claims to territory beyond that effectively controlled, although the adjacent state may justly claim the right
of notification, with an option152to make good the constructive claim by actual occupation.
In another contemporary observation on the "principle,"
Lord Salisbury, in a dispute between Portugal and Great Britain
as to a region of Central Africa between Angola and Mozambique, stated:
[T]he fact that the act of the Berlin Conference laid down
certain conditions in Articles XXXIV and XXXV in relation to new occupations on the coast of Africa, did not in any
way affect the well-established principles of international law
1 53
in regard to the occupation of land in the interior.
Far from being lax in prescribing duties incumbent on the occupying powers, the Conference stated that there was an obligation
on the Powers to maintain in regions subject to their jurisdiction
an authority and police force sufficient to ensure protection of per151. SMEDAL, supra note 30, at 44.
152. Wright, supra note 140, at 522 (footnote omitted).
153. M. LINDLEY, THE AcQUIsrrION AND GOVERNMENT OF BACKWARD TERRiTORY UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW 151 (1926).
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sons, property and necessary freedom of -trade and transit.' 54
This clearly refers to the necessity of establishing effective control over the area claimed versus actual occupation, as already discussed. It can thus be inferred that even during its vogue as a
governing norm in the nineteenth century, continuity and the Hinterland principles were not recognized as such.
Applying both principles to Antarctica, whether independently or in justification of the sector theory, no validity can be accorded them. It should furthermore be observed that several
states, including Great Britain, have rejected attempts to apply the
Hinterland principle in reverse (that is, in lieu of the extension
from 'the discovered coast inland, an extension of the sector seaward from the coast so as to encompass islands in the high seas).
Such an application is unwarranted and without precedent, especially given the dubious nature of Antarctic coast settlements
themselves.
C.

Patrimonyand Uti Possidetis

The patrimony theory, with reference to Antarctica, is confined in practice to several South American states, notably Chile,
Argentina, and Brazil. It is 'the South American version of the
uti possidetis principle of international law. The "legal" precedents often given for the concept are the Papal bulls "Inter Caetera" of 1493 and "Dudum siquidem" of 1494.'," The former
divided the new world into two spheres, the line being one hundred leagues west of the Azore and Cape Verde Islands. The
latter, elaborating 'the former, covered "all islands and mainlands
whatever, found or to be found. . . in sailing or traveling towards
the west and south, whether they be in regions occidental or meridianal, and oriental and of India." John II of Portugal agreed
to accept Inter Caetera if the line were moved 270 leagues further west, which was agreed to in the Treaty of Toredesillas in
1494.156
Chile, relying on more recent history, 'has maintained that
she succeeded to these rights, earlier vested in Spain, by right of
"uti possidetis of 1810", at the time of the break with Spain.' 57
U'i possidetis in international law has been defined as "a phrase
154. Id.

155. See note 74, supra; see also 1 C.

HYDE, INTERNATIONAL

LAw 165 (1922).

156. Id.
157. Hayton, supra, note 91, at 585.
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used to signify that the parties to a treaty are to retain possession
of what they have acquired by force during the war."'11 If such
is the history and the definition, several problems immediately
arise. First, at the time of the break with Spain, neither Spain
nor her former colonies even knew of the existence or location
of Antarctica, which was first sighted by von Bellingshausen -ten
years later. It is therefore not possible to maintain that Chile or
Argentina obtained any part of Antarctica vi et armis as required.
Second, under the general theory of state succession:
Inasmuch as the principle is really a claim of "succession,"
Argentina or Chile cannot succeed -to something the parent
state did not have in her possession to give. In any case, it
is extremely doubtful whether 'title to all lands held or discovered in the "general international neighborhood" passes
automatically to a freed colony. 15 9
Even were such claims to pass automatically, Chile and Argentina would be placed in the position of Spain and thus required
to follow the prevailing mode of acquiring title to terra nullius:
discovery followed by effective occupation.
With regard to the Antarctic, the national patrimony or uti
possidetis principles should be discounted. As Hayton observed:
the thrust of this therefore tries to get away from a terra nullius
concept and therefore avoid the problems of discovery and occupation, for the patrimonialists traditionally have assumed a low
profile in any substantial Antarctic undertaking.' 6"
A related hybrid to the patrimonialist doctrine is evident in
the current law of the sea negotiations taking place under the auspices of the United Nations in the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea, in which certain Latin and South
American States, in the Santo Domingan Declaration, enunciated
158. H. WHEATON, INTERNATIONAL LAw 627 (7th ed. 1944). And see Hayton supra note 91, at 585, who provides a broad description of the Argentine
claim:
[A]rgentine sovereignty . . . is based, among other reasons, on the aggregate of the historical antecedence of its title .

.

. maintained firmly

in all circumstances by the Argentine Government [and] spiritually
identified with the feeling of the nation's entire population; in the insuperable geographical position of the Republic; in the geological continuity of its land with the Antarctic lands; and the climatological influence
that the neighboring polar zones exercise over its territory; and the rights
of first occupancy; and the pertinent diplomatic measures; and, finally,
in its uninterrupted activity in the same Antarctic terrain.
159. Id. at 601 (footnote omitted).
160. See generally id.
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the patrimonial sea concept, another vague claim forwarded by
the same group of states.
In conclusion, unless the patrimonial claimants color their aspirant titles to Antarctica with the traditional requisite activities,
there is little merit and less logic in recognizing any of their claims.
D.

Region of Attraction

This concept has been voiced only by Soviet jurists, in connection with Soviet sector claims in the Arctic. It is somewhat
similar to the spirit behind the guidelines enunciated by the International Court of Justice in the Anglo-Norwegian Fisheries
Case,161 in that the theory stresses socio-economic links between
the mainland and the offshore islands, and the interdependence
of the mainland and island areas. Of course, the application of
such ideas to undiscovered islands and lands uninhabited by the
claimant state's nationals goes a great deal further in its import
than the inclusion in the territorial sea of discovered islands inhabited by nationals of adjacent claiming states.
The major proponent of the doctrine, the Soviet jurist Lakhtine, saw it, as did the patrimonialists, as a means of avoiding the
otherwise embarrassing requirements of effective occupation. In
description and support thereof he states:
Quite independently of this reasoning, the physical conditions and the policy of the Polar States compel this renunciating doctrine. We see indeed, that regardless of discovery
and regardless of effective occupation, the discovered lands
and islands belong as a matter of fact to States in the region
of attraction in which they are situated.
Hence, the third conclusion is inevitable, namely that
the doctrine of occupation of Polar territories
must be re1 62
placed by the doctrine of region of attraction.
Hayton, in commenting on the theory, discounts its validity
both as to the Arctic and to the Antarctic:
It cannot be presumed that the rest of the international
community has given up to states which are accidentally the
closest all rights to unoccupied lands of possible strategic importance, whether or not currently susceptible of settlement
or exploitation. Therefore severe limitations must be placed
161.

[1951] I.C.J. 116.

162. Lakhtine, supra note 24, at 17. It should be noted, however, that the
Soviets do not apply the principle to the Antarctic.
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on the use in international law of any concept involving "region of attraction," propinquity or contiguity. As an obvious
consequence of the decentralized, semi-anarchical conditions
of nation-state life, each state is concerned defensively, economically and otherwise with the area (land or sea) adjacent
to its present territory. But if applied generally, the absurdity, even the impossibility of such a principle in law, seems
clear. Argentina or Chile cannot claim Antarctic territories
merely for reasons of "attraction." If the territory in question is terra nullius, then the ordinary mode of acquisition
must be employed, though the motivation for prosecuting
such acquisition may well reflect strategic considerations. If
it is not terra nullius, the sovereign is not displaced because of
another's continguity. "Attraction" of itself yields no title to
the Antarctic or elsewhere. 168
Vi-n.

CONCLUDING REMARKS

The Eighth Antarctic Treaty Consultative Meeting, to be
held in Oslo in 1975, shall address as an agenda item the question of mineral resource exploration and exploitation in the continent."" As a consequence of the curtailment of Near East oil
shipments to the West and the artificial rise in cost to the developed and industrialized states occasioned by the reduced supply,
Antarctic treaty partners shall seriously address the resources issue
for the first time since 1959. The 1975 session of the Third
United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea shall give
added impetus to the treaty partners to find a practicable interim,
if not long range, solution to the resouces problem. Most probably
the political desire to arrive at a workable solution will lead to
the resolution of the issue in a political, if not strictly legal, manner. Given the fact that it would in all probability be more advantageous for the -treaty partners to preserve the treaty regime
and find a solution to the issue within its confines rather than risk
the chance of opening a heretofore virtually closed frontier to the
law of the sea arena and to possible eventual administration and
control under the auspices of the United Nations, the partners will
find themselves in accord. But ultimate long-range agreement
can only be predicated upon a careful and traditional interpreta163. Hayton, supra note 157, at 604 (footnote omitted).
164. State Agenda as Adopted at Preparatory Conference to the VIII Antarctic Treaty (1974).
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tion and understanding of the basis of sovereignty in Antarctica.
Failure to reach such an agreement might well lead to the eclipse
of a viable treaty regime, the demise of the status quo, and -the
application of the nascent "common heritage of mankind" concept
to all of the last remaining frontier on earth.
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